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INTRODUCTION
In its 2011 decision in Mayo Foundation for Education and
Research v. United States,1 the Supreme Court rejected tax
exceptionalism, holding that the general administrative law standards
articulated in United States v. Mead Corp.2 and Chevron USA Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.3 govern judicial review of U.S.
Department of the Treasury (“Treasury”) regulations.4 In so doing, the
Court admonished, “[W]e are not inclined to carve out an approach to
administrative review good for tax law only.”5 A few months later, the
D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc in Cohen v. United States, reinforced the
policy of administrative law uniformity in applying Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”) provisions to Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”)
guidance: “The IRS is not special in this regard; no exception exists
shielding it—unlike the rest of the Federal government—from suit
under the APA.”6 Most recently, in United States v. Home Concrete &
Supply, LLC, the Supreme Court considered the validity of a Treasury
regulation that contradicted an earlier Supreme Court interpretation
of the Internal Revenue Code (“I.R.C.”) and that was issued initially in
temporary form, in the midst of ongoing litigation, with only
postpromulgation notice and comment.7 While the Court decided that
the meaning of the statute was clear, and thus avoided several
administrative law questions raised by the briefs and the courts
below,8 the Home Concrete litigation and its many administrative law
issues were closely followed by members of the tax bar.
Taken together, these cases have given tax lawyers a fresh
awareness of administrative law doctrine as relevant to their field.9
1.
131 S. Ct. 704 (2011).
2.
533 U.S. 218 (2001).
3.
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
4.
Mayo Found., 131 S. Ct. at 714.
5.
Id. at 713.
6.
Cohen v. United States, 650 F.3d 717, 723 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (en banc).
7.
132 S.Ct. 1836, 1841–42 (2012); Kristin E. Hickman, Home Concrete: Impressions from
the Oral Argument, 134 TAX NOTES 579, 579–80 (2012).
8.
Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. at 1839–41 (concluding that the Court’s decision in Colony,
Inc. v. Comm’r, 357 U.S. 28 (1958), found the meaning of the statute clear and that stare decisis
thus precluded the Court from adopting an alternative interpretation).
9.
See, e.g., Steve R. Johnson, Intermountain and the Importance of Administrative Law
in Tax Law, 128 TAX NOTES 837, 838 (2010) (“Events in recent decades have brought into greater
prominence the intersection of tax law and administrative law.”); Patrick J. Smith, Life After
Mayo: Silver Linings, 131 TAX NOTES 1251, 1256 (2011) (“[B]y far the most important aspect of
Mayo, apart from the holding that Chevron applies to tax regulations, was the Supreme Court’s
emphasis on the principle that tax law is subject to the same administrative law rules that apply
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The tax bar’s new attention to administrative law doctrine has
potential implications for administrative law as well. Every area of
federal government administration is at least a little different from
the others, sometimes because provisions and requirements of organic
statutes vary, but just as often simply because each agency develops
its own habits and norms in administering the statutes within its
jurisdiction. Challenges to agency actions that derive from those
variations in turn explore and test the nuances and boundaries of
administrative law doctrine. Such is the case with tax. As the tax
community attempts to reconcile unique elements of tax
administration with existing administrative law doctrine, unanswered
questions regarding the latter are coming to the fore.
Perhaps the single most challenging administrative law
question for the tax community is an old perennial: what does it mean
for agency action to carry the “force of law”?10 Whether a particular
rule is legislative in character, and thus must satisfy the notice-andcomment rulemaking procedures imposed by the APA, depends upon
whether the rule carries the force of law.11 Also, whether agency action
is eligible for Chevron deference or only the ostensibly lesser Skidmore
respect turns upon whether the action carries the force of law.12 In
resolving these questions, it is not at all clear whether the force of law
occupies precisely the same conceptual space.
Contemporary tax administration practices step right into this
gray area of administrative law doctrine. The Mayo Court declared
clearly and unequivocally that Treasury regulations promulgated
in all other areas of federal law . . . .”); Thomas Greenway, Mayo Foundation Cures Tax Myopia,
TAXPROF BLOG 1 (Jan. 18, 2011), http://taxprof.typepad.com/files/mayo-kpmg.pdf (observing that
the Supreme Court’s Mayo decision “cured decades of ‘tax myopia’ . . . afflict[ing] tax
practitioners who cannot see beyond the self-contained world of tax”); cf. Paul L. Caron, Tax
Myopia, or Mamas Don’t Let Your Babies Grow Up to Be Tax Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REV. 517, 554–
57 (1994) (criticizing the tax bar for its insularity, including its neglect of administrative law
insights); Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Agency-Specific Precedents, 89 TEX. L. REV.
499, 516–26 (2011) (documenting tax deviations from administrative law norms that evolved
prior to Mayo).
10. E.g., Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard W. Murphy, Eight Things Americans Can’t Figure
Out About Controlling Administrative Power, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 5, 23 (2009) (describing the
“force of law” as “one of the more pernicious phrases in American administrative law”).
11. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 295 (1979) (“It has been established in
a variety of contexts that properly promulgated, substantive agency regulations have the ‘force
and effect of law.’ ”); Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1109
(D.C. Cir. 1993) (describing notice and comment requirements as depending upon “whether the
disputed rule has ‘the force of law’ ”); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 22, 30 n.3 (1947) (defining “substantive rules” subject to
notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements as “hav[ing] the force and effect of law”).
12. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001).
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using notice-and-comment rulemaking carry the force of law for the
purpose of Mead and Chevron, irrespective of whether Treasury issues
those regulations under specific grants of rulemaking power expressed
in individual I.R.C. provisions or through the general rulemaking
authority of I.R.C. § 7805(a).13 Yet, Treasury and the IRS continue to
claim that most Treasury regulations are interpretative rules exempt
from APA notice and comment procedures.14 Treasury also still
regularly issues temporary regulations with only postpromulgation
notice and comment and without a contemporaneous good cause
claim—arguably violating APA procedural requirements.15 Does the
Court’s conclusion in Mayo regarding the legal force of Treasury
regulations for Chevron purposes compel a conclusion that Treasury
regulations carry the force of law for APA purposes, are legislative
rules, and thus are procedurally invalid for their lack of notice and
comment? And, if Treasury does not comply with APA notice and
comment requirements in issuing its regulations, then can those
regulations carry the force of law for purposes of Chevron deference?
Judicial conclusions regarding these questions are mixed thus far.16
Beyond Treasury regulations, the IRS relies heavily on
informal guidance documents published in the Internal Revenue
Bulletin (“IRB”), particularly revenue rulings, revenue procedures,
and notices (sometimes described collectively as IRB guidance).17 The
IRS has always maintained that IRB guidance documents “do not
have the force of Treasury regulations,” and the IRS does not subject
these formats to notice-and-comment rulemaking.18 Yet, according to
Treasury regulations, failure to comply with IRB guidance may result

13. See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 714
(2011).
14. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 32.1.1.2.6 [hereinafter
INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL] (declaring that most Treasury regulations are exempt from APA
notice and comment requirements as interpretative rules “because the underlying statute
implemented by the regulation contains the necessary legal authority for the action taken and
any effect of the regulation flows directly from the statute”); see also 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2006)
(exempting interpretative rules from public notice and comment requirements).
15. See Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury’s (Lack of)
Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 82 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1727, 1759–73 (2007) (documenting this problem at length). Treasury has not demonstrably
altered its practices since the Supreme Court decided the Mayo case and continues to defend the
validity of its temporary regulations in federal court.
16. See infra notes 184–196 and accompanying text (summarizing the jurisprudence).
17. See Kristin E. Hickman, IRB Guidance: The No Man’s Land of Tax Interpretation, 2009
MICH. ST. L. REV. 239, 242–52 (analyzing contemporary IRS use of IRB guidance formats).
18. E.g., Introduction, 2012-42 I.R.B.
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in civil penalties.19 Before Mayo, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”)
routinely argued in tax cases that IRB guidance documents carry the
force of law and are entitled to Chevron deference.20 Some circuit
courts have rejected that claim, concluding that IRB guidance
documents lack the force of law and are reviewable under the
alternative Skidmore standard.21 The Ninth Circuit has reserved the
question, however, since Judge O’Scannlain opined in a concurring
opinion that a revenue procedure was legally binding and thus
Chevron eligible.22 Meanwhile, in Cohen v. United States, the D.C.
Circuit held that an IRS notice was final agency action and, therefore,
that an APA procedural challenge against it was justiciable.23 On
remand, the federal district court interpreted the Cohen court’s
analysis of the finality question as requiring a conclusion that the
notice was a legislative rule carrying the force of law and, on that
basis, invalidated the notice for lack of notice-and-comment
rulemaking.24 In short, the lower courts are definitely muddled if not
19. See I.R.C. § 6662(a)–(b)(1) (2006) (imposing penalties for failure to comply with “rules
and regulations”); Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(2) (2012) (defining “rules or regulations” as including
revenue rulings and notices); Accuracy-related Penalty, T.D. 8381, 56 Fed. Reg. 67,492-01,
67,494 (Dec. 31, 1991) (indicating that revenue procedures “may or may not be treated as ‘rules
or regulations’ depending on all facts and circumstances”).
20. See, e.g., Brief for the Appellee at 59–60, Conopco, Inc. v. United States, 572 F.3d 162
(3d Cir. 2008) (No. 07-3564), 2008 WL 4126843; Brief for the Defendant-Appellant at 42–43,
Fortis, Inc. v. United States, 447 F.3d 190 (2d Cir. 2005) (No. 05-2518), 2005 WL 5280992, at
*21–22; Brief for the Respondent-Appellant at 31, Aeroquip-Vickers, Inc. v. Comm’r, 347 F.3d
173 (6th Cir. 2002) (No. 01-2741), 2002 WL 34200821, at *17. In May 2011, a DOJ official
announced publicly that the government would no longer seek Chevron deference for IRB
guidance in litigation. See Marie Sapirie, ABA Section of Taxation Meeting: DOJ Won’t Argue for
Chevron Deference for Revenue Rulings, 131 TAX NOTES 674 (2011).
21. See, e.g., Kornman & Assoc., Inc. v. United States, 527 F.3d 443, 452–55 (5th Cir. 2008)
(concluding after full consideration that revenue rulings are not Chevron eligible); AeroquipVickers, 347 F.3d at 181 (holding that revenue rulings are entitled to Skidmore deference only).
22. See Taproot Admin. Servs., Inc. v. Comm’r, 679 F.3d 1109, 1115 n.14 (9th Cir. 2012)
(recognizing and reserving the question of whether revenue rulings are reviewable under
Chevron or Skidmore); Tualatin Valley Builders Supply, Inc. v. United States, 522 F.3d 937,
945–46 (9th Cir. 2008) (O’Scannlain, J., specially concurring) (recognizing circuit confusion
regarding the proper standard of review for IRB guidance documents and concluding that IRS
revenue procedure is entitled to Chevron deference); see also Bluetooth SIG Inc. v. United States,
611 F.3d 617, 622 (9th Cir. 2010) (acknowledging Judge O’Scannlain’s opinion without resolving
the open question of whether revenue rulings are entitled to Chevron deference); Texaco Inc. v.
United States, 528 F.3d 703, 711 (9th Cir. 2008) (avoiding the Chevron question by holding that
the revenue ruling at issue was in line with the plain meaning of the statute, but would be
worthy of deference under either Chevron or Skidmore even if the statute was unclear).
23. Cohen v. United States, 578 F.3d 1, 6–7 (D.C. Cir. 2009), aff’d en banc, 650 F.3d 717,
723 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“Put simply, ‘Notice 2006-50 binds the IRS.’ ”).
24. See In re Long-Distance Tel. Serv. Fed. Excise Tax Refund Litig., 853 F. Supp. 2d 138,
144–45 (D.D.C. 2012) (concluding on remand that Notice 2006-50 was a legislative rule and
invalidating the notice for lack of notice and comment).
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split outright over whether IRB guidance documents carry the force of
law for purposes of the APA, Chevron, or both. And, again the
questions arise, what does it mean for these documents to carry the
force of law, and can they do so for one purpose but not the other?
In short, common tax administrative practices that developed
while the tax community was on a relative hiatus from administrative
law doctrine present substantial questions for the force of law concept.
Existing standards for identifying legislative rules subject to APA
procedural requirements or for ascertaining eligibility for Chevron
deference do not offer easy or clear answers. For that matter, from
conversing with practitioners, reading briefs, and listening to oral
arguments in various tax cases, I have developed a distinct if informal
impression that tax practitioners, administrative law scholars, and
judges often talk past each other—using the same words, but with
somewhat different understandings, leading to further doctrinal
confusion.
My primary goal with this Article, therefore, is to develop a
coherent approach to judicial review of Treasury and IRS rulemaking
by sifting through overlapping lines of relevant jurisprudence,
considering the basic principles of administrative law that drive them,
and analyzing their application in the tax context. Because tax
practices are a little different from what most administrative law
scholars contemplate in considering the force of law questions that are
at the heart of this doctrinal analysis, I hope also to highlight
undeveloped aspects and offer new insights to otherwise old doctrinal
debates. In pursuing these ends, my analysis is deliberately
constrained in two key ways. First, given the complexity of my
doctrinal task, I leave in-depth normative and empirical assessment to
past and future work. Second, because the tax practices addressed by
this Article all fall within the category of rulemaking, I limit my
analysis of the relationship between Chevron deference and the force
of law to the rulemaking sphere and defer considering agency
adjudication.
Accordingly, Part I examines the status quo of the intersection
between administrative law standards and tax administrative
practices. In particular, Parts I.A and I.B summarize existing
administrative law standards for distinguishing legislative from
nonlegislative rules and for ascertaining the applicability of Chevron
review. Part I.C then documents the ongoing debate over temporary
Treasury regulations and IRB guidance under those standards.
Because current administrative law standards in this area are
notoriously murky, it is easy to focus too closely on their details and
miss the bigger picture. Therefore, Part II examines theoretical
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principles underlying the standards described in Part I. In particular,
while recognizing that delegation and procedure are closely connected,
this Article rejects the premise that procedure alone ought to
determine whether agency rules carry the force of law for either
legislative rule characterization or Chevron deference. Eligibility for
Chevron deference should not depend solely upon the presence of
notice-and-comment rulemaking, nor should courts cease requiring
notice and comment on some occasions where agencies have claimed
exemption from such procedures. Rather, according to the Supreme
Court, both questions turn on a theory of congressional delegation,
which suggests strongly that agency action either does or does not
carry the force of law simultaneously for both purposes. Following the
Supreme Court’s delegation premise, I contend that, at a minimum,
statutory penalties for noncompliance with agency rules should serve
as a definitive signal that Congress intended those rules to carry the
force of law for both the APA and Chevron deference. Further, because
Treasury has construed penalty provisions in the I.R.C. as extending
to taxpayer noncompliance with temporary Treasury regulations and
IRB guidance documents, those agency actions carry the force of law.
As a general rule, therefore, courts should evaluate the legal
interpretations advanced in these formats using the Chevron standard
and should also generally require Treasury and the IRS to satisfy APA
notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements in their promulgation.
As a practical matter, however, these doctrinal conclusions
raise significant potential difficulties for the stability of the federal
income tax system. Treasury and the IRS have been using temporary
regulations to impose controversial interpretations of the tax laws on
taxpayers for more than twenty years. Treasury has since “finalized”
many if not most of those temporary regulations with
postpromulgation notice and comment. But if the temporary
regulations were procedurally defective, at least some courts may feel
bound to find final regulations with temporary origins to be similarly
invalid. Meanwhile, taxpayers have relied upon and organized their
primary behavior to comply with these regulations. Further, Treasury
is not the only agency guilty of using temporary regulations without
the benefit of a valid good cause claim. Reviewing courts would be
right to ask whether invalidating so many regulations would do more
harm than good. Separately, while the IRS often uses IRB guidance
formats to impose controversial interpretations on taxpayers, many
other IRB guidance documents involve minor housekeeping matters
that are both essential to efficient administration of the I.R.C. and
utterly uncontroversial. Requiring notice-and-comment rulemaking
for all IRB guidance would waste scarce agency resources and could
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dry up this important tool for communicating with taxpayers. On the
other hand, extending Chevron deference to temporary Treasury
regulations and IRB guidance documents that have not gone through
notice and comment would be appalling to a tax community already
troubled by the degree of agency discretion extended by the Mayo
decision, and would risk undermining respect for and legitimacy of tax
administration as a whole.
My goal with Part III, therefore, is to find a workable path or
two out of the thicket. One such avenue is largely administrative.
Treasury is the source of the problem, both in its indiscriminate use of
temporary Treasury regulations and through its association of
penalties with temporary regulations and IRB guidance. The IRS
contributes to the problem by using the same formats for substantive
guidance and minor housekeeping matters, when it could easily
segregate those functions. Treasury and the IRS have the power to
change both the penalty regulations and their practices, at least
prospectively. Yet, absent judicial action, Treasury and the IRS are
unlikely to do so. Moreover, a decision by Treasury to self-limit the use
of temporary regulations going forward does not resolve the problem of
existing regulations with temporary origins. Returning, then, to
existing administrative law doctrine, Part III considers ways in which
courts might extend existing administrative law doctrine to avoid
giving Treasury and the IRS a complete pass for past noncompliance
with APA requirements, and thus hopefully to nudge them to realign
their practices with general administrative law norms, while
preserving certainty and respecting reliance interests within the tax
system.
I. TAX ADMINISTRATION IN THE FORCE OF LAW GRAY ZONE
The force of law concept plays a significant role in at least two
major areas of administrative law doctrine. The first is in
distinguishing between legislative rules that must comply with APA
notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures and nonlegislative rules
that are exempt from those requirements. The second involves the
Mead standard articulated by the Supreme Court for determining
which agency rules are eligible for Chevron deference.25 The courts
25. Courts also sometimes speak in force of law terms in analyzing whether or not agency
action is final and thus justiciable under the APA and other statutes. See, e.g., Cement Kiln
Recycling Coal. v. EPA, 493 F.3d 207, 226 & n.14 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (acknowledging the overlap
between jurisprudence concerning finality and legislative rule classification). The leading test for
finality uses similar “rights and obligations” language to some of the standards distinguishing
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have never precisely linked these two doctrinal lines, however, leaving
open whether the force of law means the same thing in both contexts.
Some agency rules are obviously both legislative and
reviewable under Chevron; other agency rules are clearly neither. But
a small subset of agency rules falls somewhere in the middle: possibly
but not obviously legislative, and potentially but not clearly within
Chevron’s scope. Over the years, the courts have employed various
standards for designating the rules within that subset as either
legislative or not, and Chevron eligible or not. To date, however,
applying those standards has not resulted in a consensus view of the
proper characterization of temporary Treasury regulations and IRB
guidance documents.
A. Legislative and Nonlegislative Rules
Distinguishing legislative rules from nonlegislative ones is
important.26 APA § 553 imposes several procedural requirements on
agencies seeking to promulgate legislative rules.27 These procedures
are quite burdensome. First, the agency must publish a notice of
proposed rulemaking (“NOPR”) in the Federal Register and offer
interested parties the chance to submit written comments in
response.28 So that the opportunity to comment may be meaningful,
the courts require agencies to provide enough detail of their intentions
in the NOPR to sufficiently “foreshadow[]” their final regulations.29
Because final rules must be a “logical outgrowth” of the preceding
NOPR,30 an agency that changes its mind about a critical element of a
legislative from nonlegislative rules. E.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997). Whether
nonlegislative rules that are ineligible for Chevron deference ought nevertheless to be justiciable
as final agency action is a topic for another day.
26. The APA does not actually use the legislative term to describe rules subject to notice
and comment requirements. Rather, explanations of APA provisions and both pre- and post-APA
literature and jurisprudence use the term for purposes of distinguishing such rules from
interpretative rules and policy statements. See, e.g., 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISE § 6.1 (5th ed. 2010) (using the legislative term to distinguish different kinds of
rules); Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Rules—Interpretative, Legislative, and Retroactive,
57 YALE L.J. 919, 919–31 (1948) (discussing at length the APA’s definitions for the different
kinds of “rules”); Frederic P. Lee, Legislative and Interpretive Regulations, 29 GEO. L.J. 1, 2
(1940) (discussing the difference between “legislative” and “interpretive” regulations).
27. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).
28. § 553(b)–(c).
29. Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 279 F.3d 1180, 1187–88 (9th Cir. 2002); Sw. Bell Tel.
Co. v. FCC, 168 F.3d 1344, 1353 (D.C. Cir. 1999); see also 1 PIERCE, supra note 26, § 7.3
(discussing the “sufficiently foreshadowed” test).
30. Shell Oil Co. v. EPA, 950 F.2d 741, 747 (D.C. Cir. 1991); see also, e.g., Chem. Waste
Mgmt., Inc. v. EPA, 976 F.2d 2, 28–29 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (quoting Shell Oil and using “logical
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proposed rule must issue an additional notice so that the public can
consider and comment upon the change as well.31 The NOPR must
also include sufficient information about the data and reasoning upon
which the agency relied in developing its proposed rules.32 Final
regulations must be accompanied by a “concise general statement of
[their] basis and purpose.”33 Eschewing concision, the courts have
insisted that the preamble to final regulations articulate the agency’s
response to all significant comments received.34 Finally, the APA
requires an agency to publish its final regulations in the Federal
Register thirty days before their effective date.35 The standard remedy
for regulations that fail to satisfy these requirements is invalidation.36
While contemplating legislative rules as the default
categorization for agency rulemaking, the APA recognizes several
exceptions from these procedural requirements, including exceptions
for “interpretative rules” and “general statements of policy.”37 Given
the burdens of notice-and-comment rulemaking, it is perhaps not
surprising that agencies might prefer to advance substantive legal
interpretations through these nonlegislative formats.38 As a result, the
courts generally do not accept agencies’ characterizations at face
value, but rather conduct their own inquiry into whether rules are
legislative or nonlegislative.39

outgrowth” and “directly foreshadowed” interchangeably); 1 PIERCE, supra note 26, § 7.3
(equating the “sufficiently foreshadowed” test and the “logical outgrowth” test).
31. See Shell Oil, 950 F.2d at 750–52 (holding that agencies must provide notice of
significant changes in a proposed rule, even if such changes are arguably foreseeable).
32. See, e.g., Am. Radio Relay League, Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 237 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“It
would appear to be a fairly obvious proposition that studies upon which an agency relies in
promulgating a rule must be made available during the rulemaking in order to afford interested
persons meaningful notice and an opportunity for comment.”).
33. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
34. See, e.g., United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prod. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252 (2d Cir.
1977) (“It is not in keeping with the rational process to leave vital questions, raised by comments
which are of cogent materiality, completely unanswered.”).
35. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(d).
36. See 3 PIERCE, supra note 26, § 18.1.
37. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A). Section 553 provides other exemptions from its procedural
requirements that are not relevant for the purposes of this Article. See id. § 553(a)–(b)(B)
(providing exemptions, inter alia, for rules involving military or foreign affairs, for procedural
rules, and for circumstances in which an agency makes a particular finding of good cause).
38. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Distinguishing Legislative Rules from Interpretive Rules, 52
ADMIN. L. REV. 547, 555 (2000) (“[T]he agency has an incentive to mischaracterize a legislative
rule as interpretative to circumvent the APA rulemaking procedure.”).
39. See, e.g., Hemp Indus. Ass’n v. DEA, 333 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he court
need not accept the agency characterization at face value.”); Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d 732, 746
(2d Cir. 1995) (“[T]he label that the particular agency puts upon its given exercise of
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The Supreme Court has explained that legislative rules carry
the “force and effect of law” while nonlegislative rules do not.40 The
Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act,
published shortly after Congress adopted the APA, made the same
distinction.41 The Supreme Court has never offered more precise
guidance, however, and explaining operationally what it means for an
agency rule to carry legal force has proven difficult.
When Congress enacted the APA, the general consensus among
courts and scholars held that the only rules properly characterized as
legislative were those promulgated pursuant to a narrow and specific
grant of authority to fill an explicitly identified statutory gap42—for
example, instructing an agency like the Interstate Commerce
Commission or the Federal Power Commission to impose uniform
accounting rules for industries whose rates were regulated and whose
participants consequently had to file annual reports of their assets,
income, and expenses;43 or in the tax context, authorizing Treasury to
adopt regulations for the filing of consolidated returns by affiliated
corporations.44 Many statutes, including the I.R.C., also contained
general grants authorizing “all necessary rules and regulations” (or

administrative power is not . . . conclusive.” (quoting Lewis-Mota v. Sec’y of Labor, 469 F.2d 478,
481–82 (2d Cir. 1972))).
40. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 295 (1979) (“It has been established in a variety
of contexts that properly promulgated, substantive agency regulations have the ‘force and effect
of law.’ ”); cf. Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 n.9 (1977) (quoting U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE,
supra note 11, at 30 n.3); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976) (distinguishing
“EEOC guidelines” from “administrative regulations which Congress has declared shall have the
force of law”).
41. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 30 n.3.
42. See Michael Asimow, Public Participation in the Adoption of Interpretive Rules and
Policy Statements, 75 MICH. L. REV. 520, 541 (1977) (making a similar observation).
43. See, e.g., Federal Power Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-333, 49 Stat. 847, 854 (codified at
16 U.S.C. § 825(a) (2006)); Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, Pub. L. No. 49-104, § 20, 24 Stat.
379, amended by Hepburn Act of 1906, ch. 3591, § 7, 34 Stat. 584, 593–95 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
44. I.R.C. § 1502 (2006). This I.R.C. section consists of two sentences totaling 112 words.
Treasury has exercised its authority under this provision to adopt more than 350 pages of
temporary and final regulations. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-0 et seq. Tax commenters have often
characterized regulations implementing this provision as a prototypical example of legislative
rules. See, e.g., Ellen P. Aprill, The Interpretive Voice, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2081, 2097 n.73 (2005)
(describing § 1502 as “perhaps the most famous legislative delegation”); Sheldon I. Banoff,
Dealing with the “Authorities”: Determining Valid Authority in Advising Clients, Rendering
Opinions, Preparing Tax Returns and Avoiding Penalties, 66 TAXES 1072, 1086 (1988) (citing
regulations promulgated under § 1502 in his explanation of legislative rules); Don Leatherman,
Why Rite Aid Is Wrong, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 811, 818 (2003) (citing regulations promulgated under
§ 1502 as examples of legislative regulations).
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something similar),45 but rules adopted pursuant to such authority
were considered nonbinding on regulated parties and thus
interpretative for APA purposes.46 The basis for this understanding
rested in the constitutionally derived nondelegation doctrine: general
authority grants that allowed for rules carrying the force and effect of
law would violate the Constitution’s prohibition against the delegation
of legislative power, so rules promulgated under general authority
simply had to be nonbinding.47 By the 1970s, however, with the
erosion of the nondelegation doctrine,48 agencies increasingly
exercised general authority grants to adopt regulations through
notice-and-comment rulemaking.49 The agencies then asserted, and
45. I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2006); see also, e.g., Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938,
Pub. L. No. 75-717, §701, 52 Stat. 1040, 1055–58 (“The authority to promulgate regulations for
the efficient enforcement of this chapter . . . is vested in the Secretary.”); Communications Act of
1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 4(i), 48 Stat. 1064, 1066 (“The Commission may perform any and all
acts, make such rules and regulations, and issue such orders . . . as may be necessary in the
execution of its functions.”).
46. See, e.g., 1 F. TROWBRIDGE VOM BAUR, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 489 (1942)
(“Interpretive regulations . . . are issued pursuant to a statutory provision of an entirely general
nature . . . .”); Ellsworth C. Alvord, Treasury Regulations and the Wilshire Oil Case, 40 COLUM.
L. REV. 252, 260–61 (1940) (stating that courts usually held regulations promulgated under a
grant of general authority to be interpretive rather than legislative); Stanley S. Surrey, The
Scope and Effect of Treasury Regulations Under the Income, Estate, and Gift Taxes, 88 U. PA. L.
REV. 556, 557–58 (1940) (dispelling the notion that Treasury regulations promulgated under a
revenue act are anything more than interpretive regulations); see also Davis, supra note 26, at
929–30 (contending that some specific delegations may be implied from a statute’s general
purposes and framework rather than its express authority, while describing the tax code’s
general authority grant as a paradigmatic example of express authority to issue interpretative
rules).
47. See, e.g., Alvord, supra note 46, at 260–61 (“If [Section 62 of the I.R.C.] were to be
construed as conferring on the Commissioner an unlimited power to make rules having the force
and effect of law, it would be a plainly unconstitutional delegation of power.”); John A. Fairlie,
Administrative Legislation, 18 MICH. L. REV. 181, 189 (1920) (noting the inconsistency between
the nondelegation doctrine and agency rulemaking under broad rulemaking grants); Surrey,
supra note 46, at 557–58 (contending that the phraseology of the I.R.C.’s general rulemaking
grant is too vague to be a delegation of legislative power).
48. See, e.g., 2 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.2 (2d ed. 1984)
(describing nondelegation as a failed legal doctrine); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
§ 12 (2d. ed. 1976) (opining that the nondelegation doctrine “cannot be taken literally”).
49. See 1 PIERCE, supra note 26, § 1.6. Pierce traces the dramatic rise in rulemaking
activity to several factors including the enactment of several new federal statutes in the mid- to
late-1960s that delegated rulemaking authority to new or existing agencies. See id. Pierce also
points to the Supreme Court’s decisions in United States v. Florida East Coast Railway Co., 410
U.S. 224 (1973), and Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
435 U.S. 519 (1978), which largely replaced formal rulemaking, including oral hearings with
informal rulemaking as the norm, and precluded judges from imposing procedural requirements
beyond those expressed in APA § 553 upon informal rulemaking efforts. Id.; see also Thomas W.
Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original Convention,
116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 546–59 (2002) (describing the evolution similarly).
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the courts often accepted, that these regulations were legally binding
on regulated parties.50 The specific-versus-general authority
distinction was no longer meaningful. But if some but not all rules
historically labeled as interpretative were now going to be legally
binding, then courts needed a new standard for deciding which ones
should be subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements.
Contemporary efforts to distinguish legislative rules from
nonlegislative ones have concentrated on what a rule does rather than
the source of its authority. As a matter of rhetoric, the lower courts
often say that legislative rules “create law,”51 “prescribe, modify, or
abolish duties, rights, or exemptions,”52 or “fill” statutory “gaps.”53 By
contrast, interpretative rules “seek only to interpret language” that
already exists in statutes or legislative rules,54 “merely clarify or
explain existing law or regulations,”55 or “simply state[] what the
administrative agency thinks the statute means.”56 Policy statements
“[do] not seek to change the normative standards under which [a]
50. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Pharm. Mfrs. v. FDA, 637 F.2d 877, 879–81 (2d Cir. 1981)
(discussing doctrinal shift and characterizing general authority regulations as legislative); Nat’l
Petroleum Refiners Ass’n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 678–83 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (analyzing the FTC’s
general rulemaking authority as supporting binding regulations and comparing to general
authority grants in other statutes); see also Merrill & Watts, supra note 49, at 473, 546–71
(documenting the evolution in judicial regulation of rulemaking authority).
51. E.g., Prof’ls & Patients for Customized Care v. Shalala, 56 F.3d 592, 602 (5th Cir. 1995)
(quoting Brown Express v. United States, 607 F.2d 695, 700 (5th Cir. 1979)); Indiana v. Sullivan,
934 F.2d 853, 856 (7th Cir. 1991) (quoting Cabais v. Egger, 690 F.2d 234, 238 (D.C. Cir. 1982));
Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (quoting Gibson Wine Co. v.
Snyder, 194 F.2d 329, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1952)).
52. Michael Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking and Regulatory Reform, 1985 DUKE L.J.
381, 383; see also, e.g., Hemp Indus. Ass’n v. DEA, 333 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2003)
(recognizing that legislative rules “create rights, impose obligations, or effect a change in existing
law pursuant to authority delegated by Congress”).
53. Splane v. West, 216 F.3d 1058, 1063 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (characterizing legislative rules as
those engaged in statutory “gap filling”); United Techs. Corp. v. EPA, 821 F.2d 714, 719 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (describing legislative rules as those “in which the agency sought to fill gaps and
inconsistencies left by the statutory scheme”).
54. SBC Inc. v. FCC, 414 F.3d 486, 498 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Chao v. Rothermel, 327 F.3d
223, 227 (3d Cir. 2003)); see also Syncor Int’l Corp. v. Shalala, 127 F.3d 90, 95 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(declaring a rule legislative because it “does not purport to construe any language in a relevant
statute or regulation”); Sentara-Hampton Gen. Hosp. v. Sullivan, 980 F.2d 749, 759 (D.C. Cir.
1992) (stating that a rule may be interpretative if it “represents the agency’s explanation of a
statutory or regulatory provision”).
55. Dismas Charities, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 401 F.3d 666, 679 (6th Cir. 2005)
(quoting First Nat’l Bank v. Sanders, 946 F.2d 1185, 1188–89 (6th Cir. 1991)); Nat’l Org. of
Veterans’ Advocates, Inc. v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 260 F.3d 1365, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(quoting Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. West, 138 F.3d 1434, 1436 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
56. Ass’n of Am. R.R.s v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 198 F.3d 944, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(alteration in original) (quoting Gen. Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 1561, 1565 (D.C.
Cir. 1984)).
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statute operates.”57 Instead, they set forth “the manner in which [an]
agency proposes to exercise a discretionary power,”58 such as “how the
agency plans to exercise its enforcement discretion,”59 allowing
agencies “to announce their ‘tentative intentions for the future’
without binding themselves.”60
These rhetorical descriptions offer little practical guidance.
Statutory language is often susceptible of more than one possible
meaning. Statutes rarely, if ever, explicitly address every possible
application or resolve the full range of circumstances within their
scope. While Congress sometimes instructs agencies to fill specific
statutory gaps, far more often Congress simply fails to define the
statutory terms driving particular legal consequences or adopts openended standards rather than bright-line rules. On some level, agency
pronouncements that define the undefined or designate the
applicability of open-ended standards to particular facts and
circumstances merely interpret statutory language, clarify existing
law, or describe how the agency proposes to enforce a statute. Yet,
courts have held that many such pronouncements are legislative rules
subject to APA notice and comment requirements.61 As Richard Pierce
has observed, “A rule that performs an interpretative function is a
legislative rule rather than an interpretative rule if the agency has
the statutory authority to promulgate a legislative rule and the agency
exercises that power.”62
57. Conn. Dep’t of Children & Youth Servs. v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 9 F.3d 871,
984 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see also Prof’ls & Patients for Customized Care v. Shalala, 56 F.3d 592, 596
(5th Cir. 1995) (“A general statement of policy, on the other hand, does not establish a ‘binding
norm.’ ”).
58. Conn. Dep’t of Children & Youth Servs., 9 F.3d at 984 (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
supra note 11, at 30 n.3).
59. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Veneman, 469 F.3d 826, 839 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Syncor
Int’l Corp., 127 F.3d at 96 (suggesting that enforcement discretion is relevant in connection with
distinguishing policy statements from legislative rules).
60. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (quoting Pac. Gas &
Elec. Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974)); see also Veneman, 469 F.3d at
839 (quoting Am. Hosp. Ass’n for the same proposition); Prof’ls & Patients for Customized Care,
56 F.3d at 596.
61. See, e.g., Catholic Health Initiatives v. Sebelius, 617 F.3d 490, 494–96 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(describing examples of supposed mere interpretations that are nevertheless legislative rules,
and holding a rule elaborating “reasonable costs” to be legislative); Tunik v. Merit Systems
Protection Bd., 407 F.3d 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (concluding that an agency’s interpretation of the
statutory term “removal” as including constructive removals was a legislative rule); cf. Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (describing EPA
regulation defining the statutory term “stationary source” as “legislative”).
62. 1 PIERCE, supra note 26, § 6.4; cf. Cent. Tex. Tel. Coop., Inc. v. FCC, 402 F.3d 205, 212
(D.C. Cir. 2005) (“The APA’s definition of ‘rule’ contemplates that all types of rules, legislative
and interpretive alike, may interpret ‘law.’ ”).
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Moving past the rhetoric, therefore, courts have tried to
identify criteria that demonstrate whether a rule operates with the
force of law. Early on, courts simply looked to whether a rule, by its
own terms, was “an authoritative implementation” under the relevant
statute, such that “in an enforcement action an agency need prove
only that the defendant’s conduct was contrary to the rule.”63 In other
words, did the rule in question “create, by its own force, a legally
binding standard of conduct”?64 If the rule on its face carried such
legal effect, then it was a legislative rule. In practice, courts
evaluating a rule’s legal effect relied heavily on agencies’
characterizations of their own rules.65 Courts and others realized that
agencies could avoid APA procedures and yet substantially influence
the actions of regulated parties by labeling rules as nonlegislative
while treating them as conclusive.66 Hence, contemporary courts
typically use an agency’s characterization of its rules and their legal
effects as at most a starting point.67

63. William T. Mayton, A Concept of a Rule and the “Substantial Impact” Test in
Rulemaking, 33 EMORY L.J. 889 (1984); see also, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n,
506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (describing the test in similar terms); Thomas W. Merrill, The
Mead Doctrine: Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules and Meta-Standards, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 807,
827 (2002) (same).
64. Asimow, supra note 42, at 543; see also Amer. President Lines, Ltd. v. Fed. Mar.
Comm’n, 316 F.2d 419, 421 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (speaking similarly of legislative rules as
“independently enforcible”).
65. See, e.g., Amer. President Lines, 316 F.2d at 421 (relying on agency’s characterization of
its own rule); Asimow, supra note 42, at 543; Mayton, supra note 63, at 907–08.
66. See, e.g., COMM. ON GOV’T REFORM, 106TH CONG., NON-BINDING LEGAL EFFECT OF
AGENCY GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS, H.R. REP. NO. 106-1009, at 9 (2000) (“[A]gencies have
sometimes improperly used guidance documents as a backdoor way to bypass the statutory
notice-and-comment requirements for agency rulemaking and establish new policy
requirements.”); Mayton, supra note 63, at 906 (recognizing that relying on agency
characterizations makes it easy for agencies to avoid rulemaking). A fairly recent study by
Connor Raso suggests that agencies do not strategize their use of nonlegislative rules in this
way. Connor Raso, Strategic or Sincere? Analyzing Agency Use of Guidance Documents, 119 YALE
L.J. 782 (2010). Even if Raso is correct that agencies do not deliberately set out to circumvent the
APA’s procedural requirements in pursuing major policy initiatives, they have little incentive not
to over-rely on informal guidance absent careful judicial oversight. Tax administration
represents a good example of this phenomenon in action. See discussion infra Part I.C.2. Raso
notably recognizes the IRS for using guidance more often than other agencies. See Raso, supra,
at 822.
67. See, e.g., Hemp Indus. Ass’n v. DEA, 333 F.3d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that
an agency’s characterization of a rule “does not end the inquiry into whether the rule is
legislative”); Mejia-Ruiz v. INS, 51 F.3d 358, 363–65 (2d Cir. 1995) (calling an agency’s
characterization of a rule a “starting point” but focusing the analysis principally on statutory
provisions); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 1561, 1565 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc)
(“First, the agency’s own label, while relevant, is not dispositive.”).
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In Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, the Court advised that legislative
rules that carry the force of law “affect[] individual rights and
obligations.”68 Drawing from this description, some courts have
focused on the practical impact of a rule rather than its facial legal
effect, asking whether the rule in question substantially affected the
rights and duties of regulated parties.69 But if the legal effect test was
too narrow and allowed agency action improperly to escape the APA’s
notice and comment requirements, the substantial impact test was too
broad. Prudent regulated parties scour even the most casual agency
statements for clues and hints as to the agency’s interpretations,
policy preferences, and goals, and adjust their behavior accordingly.70
The courts are rightly wary of characterizing every agency action that
might influence regulated party behavior as a legislative rule subject
to the requirements of notice-and-comment rulemaking for fear of
discouraging agencies from issuing informal guidance.71 As Judge
Stephen Williams noted writing for the D.C. Circuit in American
Mining Congress v. Mine Safety and Health Administration:
The protection that Congress sought to secure by requiring notice and
comment for legislative rules is not advanced by reading the
exemption for ‘interpretive rule’ so narrowly as to drive agencies into
pure ad hocery—an ad hocery, moreover, that affords less notice, or
less convenient notice, to affected parties. 72

Seeking a middle ground for legislative rules—more inclusive
than legal effect but less expansive than substantial impact—the
circuits have settled on two tests that attempt to identify rules that
agencies do not freely admit possess legal effect but that carry
sufficient weight that notice and comment should be required. The
standard used by the Fifth Circuit in particular is a modified

68. 441 U.S. 281, 302 (1979) (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 232 (1974)).
69. See, e.g., Reynolds Metals Co. v. Rumsfeld, 564 F.2d 663, 669 (4th Cir. 1977) (“[N]otice
and comment is required if the rule makes a substantive impact on the rights and duties of the
person subject to regulation.”); Lewis-Mota v. Sec’y of Labor, 469 F.2d 478, 482 (2d Cir. 1972)
(rejecting a rule for lack of notice and comment because “it changed existing rights and
obligations” and thus had “substantial impact”).
70. See, e.g., Mayton, supra note 63, at 893 (noting that “the agency can, as it is said,
regulate by means of ‘a raised eyebrow’ ”). Mayton distinguishes the substantial impact test from
the “force of law” test—a term he uses interchangeably with legal effects.
71. See, e.g., Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Dep’t of Energy, 589 F.2d 1082, 1095 (Temp.
Emer. Ct. App. 1978) (observing that “under the ‘substantial impact’ test every significant
interpretative rule automatically becomes a legislative rule by virtue of its effect”); Levesque v.
Block, 723 F.2d 175, 182 (1st Cir. 1983) (agreeing “that substantial impact does not make the
rule legislative”).
72. Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1112 (D.C. Cir.
1993).
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substantial impact test that asks both whether the rule at issue
imposes “rights and obligations” on regulated parties and also whether
the rule leaves the agency and its decisionmakers free to exercise
discretion or, conversely, binds the agency as well as regulated
parties.73 Most circuits, however, utilize a test that derives from the
D.C. Circuit’s opinion in American Mining Congress.74 According to
that decision, a rule is legislative “if Congress has delegated
legislative power to the agency and if the agency intended to exercise
that power in promulgating the rule.”75 The D.C. Circuit in American
Mining Congress and subsequent cases has identified various
elements which, if present, indicate the agency’s intent to act
legislatively:76
 Whether the rule is necessary to provide legislative basis
for an enforcement action or conferral of benefits;77
 Whether the rule revokes or alters an existing legislative
rule;78
 Whether the agency has explicitly invoked its general
legislative authority;79 or
 Whether the rule in question seeks to interpret a legislative
rule that is itself too vague or open ended to provide
independent support for the alleged interpretative rule.80
If the answer to any of the above-listed questions is affirmative, then
the court considers the agency to be acting with the intent to bind
regulated parties with the force of law, and the rule is legislative in
73. Tex. Sav. & Cmty. Bankers Ass’n v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Bd., 201 F.3d 551, 556 (5th Cir.
2000); Prof’ls & Patients for Customized Care v. Shalala, 56 F.3d 592, 595 (5th Cir. 1995).
74. See, e.g., Hemp Indus. Ass’n v. DEA, 333 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying the
American Mining Congress test); New York City Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. SEC, 45 F.3d 7, 13 (2d
Cir. 1995) (same); Elizabeth Blackwell Health Ctr. for Women v. Knoll, 61 F.3d 170, 181 (3d Cir.
1995) (same); Mission Group Kan., Inc. v. Riley, 146 F.3d 775, 784 (10th Cir. 1988) (same).
75. See Am. Mining Cong., 995 F.2d at 1109; see also, e.g., Elizabeth Blackwell Health Ctr.,
61 F.3d at 187 (recognizing the same definition of legislative rule); 1 PIERCE, supra note 26, § 6.4
(characterizing a rule as legislative “if the agency has the statutory authority to promulgate a
legislative rule and the agency exercises that power”).
76. See 1 PIERCE, supra note 26, § 6.4 (summarizing the evolution of the American Mining
Congress test).
77. See Am. Mining Cong., 995 F.2d at 1112; see also, e.g., Sweet v. Sheahan, 235 F.3d 80,
92–93 (2d Cir. 2000) (characterizing a rule as legislative on this basis); Warder v. Shalala, 149
F.3d 73, 80–81 (1st Cir. 1998) (applying this factor).
78. See Am. Mining Cong., 995 F.2d at 1112; see also, e.g., Cent. Tex. Tel. Coop., Inc. v.
FCC, 402 F.3d 205, 211–12 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (considering particularly this factor); Hemp Indus.
Ass’n, 333 F.3d at 1088 (same).
79. See Am. Mining Cong., 995 F.2d at 1112.
80. See, e.g., Catholic Health Initiatives v. Sebelius, 617 F.3d 490, 494–95 (D.C. Cir. 2010);
Hoctor v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 82 F.3d 165, 169–72 (7th Cir. 1996).
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character.81 Some, but not all, circuits will also treat a rule as
legislative and require notice and comment if it alters or revokes an
existing interpretative rule, if that existing rule is sufficiently “wellestablished, definitive, and authoritative.”82 Finally, publication of the
rule in the Code of Federal Regulations serves as a potential
additional indicator that the rule is legislative, but is insufficient on
its own to be dispositive.83
For policy statements, the courts typically rely upon a “binding
norm” standard that, in its analysis if not its label, strongly resembles
the Fifth Circuit’s modified substantial effect test described above.84 In
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Federal Power Commission, the D.C.
Circuit stated that, unlike legislative rules, a general statement of
policy “does not establish a ‘binding norm.’ It is not finally
determinative of the issues or rights to which it is addressed.”85 In
American Bus Ass’n v. United States, the D.C. Circuit elaborated and
expanded the binding norm standard by articulating two criteria for
identifying a policy statement: first, that the purported policy
statement “not impose any rights and obligations on” regulated
parties86 and, second, that it “leave[] the agency and its
decisionmakers free to exercise discretion.”87 Courts applying the
81. See Am. Mining Cong., 995 F.2d at 1112.
82. Warshauer v. Solis, 577 F.3d 1330, 1338 (11th Cir. 2009) (documenting a circuit split
over this approach); see also 1 PIERCE, supra note 26, § 6.4 (same). This element was originally
advanced by the D.C. Circuit in Paralyzed Veterans of America v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579
(D.C. Cir. 1997). See also, e.g., Alaska Prof’l Hunters Ass’n v. FAA, 177 F.3d 1030, 1033–36 (D.C.
Cir. 1999) (applying this element to characterize a rule as legislative); Shell Offshore Inc. v.
Babbitt, 238 F.3d 622, 629 (5th Cir. 2001) (same). But see, e.g., Miller v. Cal. Speedway Corp.,
536 F.3d 1020, 1033 (9th Cir. 2008) (rejecting this approach); 1 PIERCE, supra note 26, § 6.4
(criticizing this justification for characterizing a rule as legislative).
83. The D.C. Circuit in American Mining Congress included this element on its list of
dispositive factors, but subsequently recognized that agencies also sometimes publish
interpretative rules. See, e.g., Hemp Indus. Ass’n, 333 F.3d at 1087 n.5; Sweet v. Sheahan, 235
F.3d 80, 91 n.8 (2d Cir. 2000); Health Ins. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 412, 423 (D.C.
Cir. 1994).
84. See, e.g., Sacora v. Thomas, 628 F.3d 1059, 1069 (9th Cir. 2010) (applying the binding
norm standard to evaluate whether agency action qualified for the policy statement exception);
Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. Sec’y of Labor, 589 F.3d 1368, 1371 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Ryder Truck
Lines, Inc. v. United States, 716 F.2d 1369, 1377 (11th Cir. 1983)) (same).
85. 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
86. 627 F.2d 525, 529 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (quoting Texaco v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 412 F.2d
740, 744 (3d Cir. 1969)); see also Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(recognizing binding norm criteria).
87. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 818 F.2d at 946; see also, e.g., Sacora, 628 F.3d at 1069
(describing policy statements in similar terms); Nat’l Mining Ass’n, 589 F.3d at 1371 (quoting
Ryder Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 716 F.2d 1369, 1377 (11th Cir. 1983)) (applying the
binding norm standard).
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binding norm standard also sometimes consider whether agency
actions alleged to be policy statements operate only prospectively.88
As with interpretative rules, even if policy statements lack
formal binding effect on regulated parties, they may still have coercive
effects on regulated party behavior. In other words, even if an agency
cannot rely on an exempt policy statement to bind regulated parties to
its policy preferences, an agency may be able to use a policy statement
to influence regulated parties strongly in that direction.89 Hence, in
Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit seemed to extend the
binding norm standard to statements that were “practically binding,”
meaning that the agency usually acted consistently with its stated
policy notwithstanding its supposed discretion to behave otherwise.90
And in Cement Kiln Recycling Coalition v. EPA, the court indicated
that “whether the agency action binds private parties or the agency
itself with the ‘force of law,’ ”—that is, whether the agency action is a
legislative rule rather than a policy statement—turns on whether “as
a practical matter” the agency action “either appears on its face to be
binding, or is applied by the agency in a way that indicates it is
binding.”91 Yet, in another recent case, National Ass’n of Home
Builders v. Norton,92 the court seemed to retreat from its focus on
practical binding effect, emphasizing instead the lack of legal
consequences from the agency action at issue. The court has not
repudiated the practical binding iteration of its binding norm
standard, but may be attempting to limit its applicability to
particularly egregious circumstances.
Whichever of the above standards a court applies in
distinguishing legislative rules from nonlegislative ones, since courts
acquiesced to the idea that rules issued pursuant to general authority
could be legislative rules, there has been no question that agency rules
qualify when they carry facial legal effect by binding the actions of
regulated parties. The tests that courts employ all operate with the
presumption that, whatever the outer boundaries of the legislative
rule category, any rule that, on its face and by its own terms, seeks to
88. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce of United States v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 174 F.3d 206,
212–13 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (substituting “prospective effect” for the rights and obligations factor of
the binding norm standard); Mada-Luna v. Fitzpatrick, 813 F.2d 1006, 1016 (9th Cir. 1987)
(discussing prospective effect).
89. See, e.g., Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(expressing this concern).
90. Id. at 1020 (quoting Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking,
47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 85 (1995)).
91. 493 F.3d 207, 227 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
92. 415 F.3d 8 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
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bind regulated parties carries the force of law. Rather than
supplanting the old legal effect test outright, therefore, the
jurisprudence has sought merely to expand the legislative category
beyond facial legal effect to include an additional subset of legislative
rules: those that on their face purport not to be legally binding but
that carry a sufficient degree of binding effect as to cross the
legislative line.
B. Mead and Chevron
Apart from judicial efforts to classify rules for APA procedural
purposes, the force of law concept is also central to the question of
which standard of review courts should employ in evaluating agency
statutory interpretations. In Christensen v. Harris County93 and
United States v. Mead Corp.,94 the Supreme Court identified two
primary alternatives.95
The first is the highly deferential standard articulated in
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., with
its two-part test.96 Recognizing that “the court, as well as the agency,
must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress,”
Chevron step one considers whether the statute being interpreted
unambiguously resolves the issue at bar.97 If, and only if, it does not,
then Chevron step two asks merely “whether the agency’s answer is
based on a permissible construction of the statute,” and mandates
judicial deference if the answer is affirmative.98
The second, and arguably less deferential, alternative review
standard highlighted by Christensen and Mead is a multifactor
93. 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
94. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
95. Notwithstanding Mead, William Eskridge and Lauren Baer have identified a few
others that the Supreme Court, at least, has applied in evaluating agency statutory
interpretations in the post-Chevron era. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The
Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from
Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1099–1100 (2008). Yet, Eskridge and Baer also recognize
Mead’s emphasis on Chevron and Skidmore as the two primary doctrinal alternatives and also
advocate a deference regime focused principally on these two alternatives, with a more limited
role for Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006). See id. at 1157, 1183–85 (urging the Court to
simplify its deference regime by expanding the understanding of Skidmore and Chevron
deference).
96. 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
97. Id. at 842. The Chevron decision frames this step one inquiry variably as “whether
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue,” whether “the intent of Congress is
clear,” and whether “the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue”—three
rhetorical formulations that do not necessarily call for the same analysis. Id. at 842–43.
98. .Id. at 843.
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approach exemplified by Skidmore v. Swift.99 The Court in Skidmore
allowed a reviewing court to decide for itself the appropriate level of
deference, if any, by analyzing various factors including, but not
limited to, “the thoroughness evident in [the interpretation’s]
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier
and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to
persuade, if lacking power to control.”100 Other cases applying
Skidmore have additionally identified as relevant factors the formality
of the agency’s decisionmaking process, the longevity of the agency’s
interpretation, the contemporaneity of that interpretation with the
enactment of the statute, and the degree of agency expertise required
in answering the interpretive question.101
In Mead, the Court held that Chevron applies only if Congress
has given the agency in question the authority to bind regulated
parties with “the force of law” and if the agency has in fact acted “in
the exercise of that authority.”102 If either of these conditions is
lacking, then Skidmore provides the appropriate evaluative
standard.103
Just as agencies have an incentive to characterize their rules
as nonlegislative, and thus avoid the burdens of notice-and-comment
rulemaking, they also have good reason to push in the opposite
direction at the boundaries of Mead: to claim that their rules carry the
force of law and thereby obtain the maximum level of judicial
deference through the Chevron standard. Having pronounced the force
of law as the touchstone for Chevron deference, however, the Court
has again declined to specify precisely what it means by that concept.
Agencies frequently wear multiple hats—as quasi-legislators
charged with filling statutory gaps, as executive branch subordinates
responsible for administering and enforcing the laws, and as quasijudicial bodies evaluating the actions and claims of regulated
parties.104 Whether or not they have the authority to adopt legally
99. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
100. Id. at 140.
101. For example, citing Skidmore, the Mead Court paraphrased these factors in describing
the standard as based upon “the degree of the agency’s care, its consistency, formality, and
relative expertness, and . . . the persuasiveness of the agency’s position.” United States v. Mead
Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001); see also Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of
the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1258–59 (2007) (documenting factors
articulated by the Supreme Court in applying Skidmore).
102. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 227.
103. See id.
104. See, e.g., FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(“Administrative agencies have been called quasi-legislative, quasi-executive or quasi-judicial, as
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binding legislative rules, all agencies must interpret statutes in the
course of discharging their myriad duties.105 Private parties subject to
statutory requirements or eligible for statutory benefits certainly care
what those agency officials think the statute means, whether or not
those interpretations carry legal force. But Chevron deference “is not
accorded merely because the statute is ambiguous and an
administrative official is involved.”106 Rather, the Chevron standard
requires a delegation from Congress, as expressed in a statute, as well
as an exercise of that delegated power.107
The Mead test thus really raises two separate questions
regarding the force of law. First, how do we know when an agency
possesses the power to act with legal force? Second, if we conclude or
assume that an agency enjoys that power, then how do we decide
which agency actions are in exercise thereof?
The Court has recognized both express and implied delegations
as giving rise to Chevron eligibility.108 Express delegations are
straightforward. As discussed above with respect to legislative rules,
Congress sometimes specifically tells an agency to adopt rules and
regulations to accomplish a specific purpose or fill a statutorily
identified gap.109 Hence, in the Chevron opinion itself, the Court
described these express or specific delegations as offering the agency
the power “to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by
regulation.”110 Later, in Mead, the Court described express delegations
as conveying “the responsibility to implement a particular provision or
fill a particular gap.”111 In other words, specific grants of rulemaking
authority are most obviously within the range of delegations leading
to Chevron review.
Implied delegations are harder. The Court in Chevron did not
elaborate the concept explicitly. Nevertheless, the EPA regulation at

the occasion required, in order to validate their functions within the separation-of-powers
scheme of the Constitution.”).
105. See 1 PIERCE, supra note 26, § 6.2 (“Any agency has the inherent power to issue an
interpretative rule, a policy statement, or a procedural rule to implement a statute it
administers.”).
106. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 229; see also United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC,
132 S. Ct. 1836, 1844 (2012) (quoting Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 229, for this same proposition).
107. See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44
(1984); see also Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 229–31 & n.11 (discussing the relationship between
congressional delegations and Chevron review).
108. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44.
109. See discussion supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text.
110. 467 U.S. at 844.
111. 533 U.S. at 229.
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issue in that case was not issued pursuant to a specific rulemaking
grant. Instead, the regulation relied on the EPA’s general authority
“to prescribe such regulations as are necessary to carry out [its]
functions under” the Clean Air Act to elaborate ambiguous statutory
language.112 In subsequent cases, the Court has been more explicit in
recognizing that general rulemaking grants support regulations with
the force of law. For example, in Household Credit Services, Inc. v.
Pfennig, the Court found the requisite delegation in 15 U.S.C. §
1604(a), which at that time authorized the Federal Reserve Board to
“prescribe regulations to carry out the purposes of” the Truth In
Lending Act, including “such additional requirements, classifications,
differentiations, or other provisions . . . as in the judgment of the
Board are necessary or proper to effectuate the purposes of [the Act],
to prevent circumvention or evasion thereof, or to facilitate compliance
therewith.”113 In National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand
X Internet Services, Inc., the Court recognized the statutory authority
of the Federal Communications Commission to “prescribe such rules
and regulations as may be necessary in the public interest to carry out
the provisions” of the Communications Act as a delegation of “the
authority to promulgate binding legal rules.”114 Finally, the Supreme
Court in the Mayo case recognized Treasury’s authority to adopt “ ‘all
needful rules and regulations for the enforcement’ of the Internal
Revenue Code” to be a sufficient basis for extending Chevron
deference, and in doing so stated expressly, “Our inquiry in that
regard does not turn on whether Congress’s delegation of authority
was general or specific.”115
Still, not every seemingly broad delegation of general authority
to adopt rules or regulations qualifies, it seems. Gonzales v. Oregon
112. At least, this is the consensus among administrative law scholars. See, e.g., John F.
Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113, 199–200 (1998)
(observing that the Solicitor General began his argument in Chevron by quoting in full the Clean
Air Act’s general authority language); Merrill & Watts, supra note 49, at 473 (“[T]he Supreme
Court’s Chevron decision treated as legally binding a rule adopted by the [EPA] pursuant to its
general rulemaking powers under the Clean Air Act.”). The preamble to those regulations cited
four sections of the Clean Air Act, only one of which was the general authority provision.
Requirements for Preparation, Adoption and Submittal of Implementation Plans and Approval
and Promulgation of Implementation Plans, 46 Fed. Reg. 50,766, 50,771 (Oct. 14, 1981) (citing,
inter alia, 42 U.S.C. § 7601(a) (1976)).
113. 15 U.S.C. § 1604(a) (2006); Household Credit Servs., Inc. v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232, 238
(2004) (quoting parts of 15 U.S.C. § 1604(a) and extending Chevron deference accordingly). The
statute has since been amended to shift responsibility for Truth in Lending Act to a new agency,
but the scope of the delegation otherwise remains the same.
114. 545 U.S. 967, 980–81 (2005).
115. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct 704, 713–14 (2011).
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offers an interesting example.116 That case concerned an
interpretation of the Controlled Substances Act advanced by the
Attorney General through a document labeled an “interpretive
rule.”117 The Court agreed with the government that the statute was
ambiguous, but declined to evaluate the Attorney General’s
interpretation through the Chevron lens on the ground that the
Attorney General’s rule did not derive from congressionally delegated
power to act with the force of law. In reaching that conclusion, the
Court identified and considered two particular provisions in the
Controlled Substances Act granting rulemaking authority to the
Attorney General. The first provision, 21 U.S.C. § 821, contained a
specific grant to make rules “relating to the registration and control of
the manufacture, distribution, and dispensing of controlled substances
and to listed chemicals.”118 The second provision, 21 U.S.C. § 871(b),
authorized rules “for the efficient execution of [the Attorney General’s]
functions under” the Act.119 The Court implied that the first of these
two grants would be adequate to support rules carrying the force of
law, but the rule in question fell outside its terms. Meanwhile,
according to the Court, in authorizing rules for the “execution” of
government “functions,” Congress did not give the Attorney General
the general power to construe the Act’s substantive terms. In other
words, the delegation contained in 21 U.S.C. § 871(b), while broadly
written, was also textually limited, and thus was distinguishable from
the general authority grants previously recognized by the Court for
Chevron purposes.
Even if a court concludes that Congress has delegated the
requisite authority to act with the force of law, not every agency
pronouncement will qualify as an exercise of that power. The Court
has been less than clear, however, in explaining which agency rules
are Chevron eligible. In Mead, the Court recognized notice-andcomment rulemaking along with formal adjudication as evidence that
an agency intended to act with the legal force required for Chevron

116. 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
117. To be precise, the interpretive rule, which lacked public notice and comment, purported
to interpret regulations previously adopted by the Attorney General using notice-and-comment
rulemaking. The Gonzales Court declined the government’s invitation to characterize the case as
concerning an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations, on the ground that the regulations
merely parroted the language of the statute. See id. at 257. Had the Court framed the case as the
government preferred, the appropriate standard of review would have been that described in
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
118. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 259 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 821).
119. Id. (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 871(b)).
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deference,120 but explicitly declined to limit Chevron’s reach to those
two formats.121 The only alternative example offered by the Mead
Court, however, was a bare citation to NationsBank of North Carolina,
N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co.,122 which concerned an
agency adjudication conducted according to procedures contained in
the agency’s organic statute rather than the APA.123 Similarly, Mead
itself concerned an informal adjudication—a tariff ruling letter that
applied only to the party to whom it was issued. Meanwhile, in
Christensen v. Harris County, which predates but foreshadowed Mead,
the Court stated that opinion letters as well as “policy statements,
agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines” lack the force of law and
are ineligible for Chevron deference.124
One could read Christensen and Mead together as suggesting
that Chevron’s domain extends only to notice-and-comment
regulations plus some broader collection of formal and informal
adjudications. Since deciding Mead, the Court has often linked the
agency’s use of notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures with a
rule’s eligibility for Chevron deference.125 The only instances not
involving notice-and-comment regulations in which the post-Mead
Court has actually applied Chevron review to evaluate agency action
have involved informal adjudications, not rulemaking.126 Consistent
with Christensen, the Court has consistently extended only Skidmore
review to agency rules that lack notice and comment.127
120. .United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001) (“Thus, the overwhelming
number of our cases applying Chevron deference have reviewed the fruits of notice-and-comment
rulemaking or formal adjudication.”).
121. See id. at 230–31 (“[A]s significant as notice-and-comment is in pointing to Chevron
authority, the want of that procedure here does not decide the case . . . .”).
122. NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251 (1995).
123. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 231.
124. Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).
125. See, e.g., Mayo Found. for Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 714
(2011); Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 129 S. Ct. 2458, 2469 (2009); Nat’l
Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005); Yellow Transp., Inc.
v. Michigan, 537 U.S. 36, 45 (2002).
126. See Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 516 (2009) (extending Chevron deference to
Bureau of Immigration Affairs adjudication interpreting the Immigration and Nationality Act);
United States v. Eurodif, 555 U.S. 305, 316 (2009) (granting Chevron deference to Commerce
Department interpretation of the Tariff Act in adjudication).
127. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 246 (2006) (applying Skidmore standard and
declining to defer to interpretative rule); Raymond B. Yates, M.D., P.C. Profit Sharing Plan v.
Hendon, 541 U.S. 1, 17 (2004) (citing Skidmore in support of deference to agency advisory
opinion); Clackamas Gastroenterology Assoc., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 449 n.9 (2003)
(analogizing the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) Compliance Manual to
nonbinding formats identified as only worthy of Skidmore review by Christensen). Less directly,
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Nevertheless, the Court has continued to maintain that notice
and comment are neither necessary nor sufficient to justify Chevron
deference.128 Further, in Barnhart v. Walton, the Court extended
Chevron deference to an agency regulation not only for its notice-andcomment pedigree but additionally for the agency’s “longstanding”
embrace of the same interpretation in less formal rulings and
guidance documents—seemingly suggesting that such interpretive
formats might on some occasions be Chevron eligible.129
The Supreme Court’s refusal to limit Chevron deference to
notice-and-comment regulations and its simultaneous failure to
elaborate the circumstances when other agency rules might be
Chevron eligible have perplexed lower courts forced to evaluate agency
rules that lack notice and comment procedures. Courts in a few cases
have responded essentially by favoring Barnhart over Mead and
applying the Chevron standard to informal agency actions that the
Court in Christensen marked for Skidmore review.130 But many lower
courts appear to have dealt with the uncertainty by ignoring it, simply
treating the absence of notice and comment as dispositive without
further inquiry, notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s contrary
advice.131

in Wisconsin Department of Health and Family Services v. Blumer, the Court cited Mead as
supporting “respectful consideration” for a proposed regulation and informal ruling letter—
reasoning the dissent characterized as Skidmore review. 534 U.S. 473, 497 (2002); id. at 505
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Also, in Dada v. Mukasey, the Court again counseled “respectful
consideration” for a proposed regulation and cited Wisconsin Department of Health and Family
Services v. Blumer for this proposition. 554 U.S. 1, 20–21 (2008).
128. See, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomms., 545 U.S. at 1004 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(quoting Mead for the proposition that “notice-and-comment rulemaking [does] ‘not decide the
case’ ” for or against Chevron deference); see also Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll., 535 U.S. 106, 114
(2002) (agreeing that “deference under [Chevron] does not necessarily require an agency’s
exercise of express notice-and-comment rulemaking power”).
129. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 219–22 (2002).
130. See, e.g., Kruse v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 383 F.3d 49, 60–61 (2d Cir. 2004)
(relying on Barnhart to extend Chevron deference to policy statement lacking notice and
comment); Schuetz v. Banc One Mortg. Corp., 292 F.3d 1004, 1011–13 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Chevron
deference is due even though HUD’s Policy Statements are not the result of formal rulemaking
or adjudication.”); see also Hagans v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 694 F.3d 287, 300 (3d Cir. 2012)
(deriving several factors from Barnhart for the purpose of determining whether a Social Security
Acquiescence Ruling was eligible for Chevron deference notwithstanding its lack of notice and
comment); Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action,
58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1458–64 (2005) (recognizing the doctrinal inconsistency between
Barnhart and Mead and discussing circuit courts following the former).
131. See, e.g., Lopez v. Terrell, 654 F.3d 176, 182–83 (2d Cir. 2011) (declining to defer to
Bureau of Prisons Administrative Remedy Program Letter for lack of notice and comment);
Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 626 F.3d 799, 805–06 (5th Cir. 2010) (rejecting Chevron
deference for HUD policy statement for lack of notice and comment); Bradley v. Sebelius, 621
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C. Tax Administrative Practices
No one seriously doubts that Treasury and its delegee, the IRS,
have the congressionally delegated power to act with legally binding
force.132 The I.R.C. contains precisely the sort of grants of rulemaking
authority that the Supreme Court has described both in Chrysler
Corp. v. Brown and in Mead and its progeny. Numerous I.R.C.
provisions authorize or even command Treasury to adopt regulations
to fill specific, congressionally identified gaps.133 In addition, I.R.C. §
7805(a) authorizes Treasury to adopt “all needful rules and
regulations for the enforcement of” the I.R.C. without imposing any
subject matter limitations of the sort at issue in Gonzales v. Oregon.134
Treasury has long conceded that regulations promulgated
pursuant to specific authority grants are legislative rules subject to
APA notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures.135 Treasury also
purports to comply with APA notice and comment requirements in
adopting all of its regulations,136 and more often than not does follow
those procedures at least in form.137 Courts and tax commentators
have correspondingly agreed for many years that specific authority
Treasury regulations are eligible for Chevron deference.138 More
recently, the Supreme Court in Mayo found I.R.C. § 7805(a)’s general
authority grant also to be the sort of “express congressional
authorization to engage in the process of rulemaking” that serves as “a
very good indicator of delegation meriting Chevron treatment.”139

F.3d 1330, 1338, 1338 n.18 (11th Cir. 2010) (rejecting HHS claim to Chevron deference for
Medicare field manual lacking notice and comment).
132. See, e.g., Haffner’s Serv. Stations, Inc. v. Comm’r, 326 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2003)
(recognizing binding force of Treasury regulations); Suzy’s Zoo v. Comm’r, 273 F.3d 875, 881 n.7
(9th Cir. 2001) (same); Irving Salem et al., ABA Section of Taxation Report of the Task Force on
Judicial Deference, 57 TAX LAW. 717, 737–44 (2004) (same).
133. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1502 (2006).
134. I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2006); see also supra notes 116–19 and accompanying text (discussing
Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006)).
135. See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 14, § 32.1.1.4.
136. See id.
137. See Hickman, supra note 15, at 1749 (documenting that, during at least one three-year
period, Treasury followed the traditional notice-and-comment sequence with roughly sixty
percent of its regulation projects).
138. See, e.g., Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. United States, 142 F.3d 973, 978–79 (1998);
UnionBanCal Corp. v. Comm’r, 113 T.C. 309, 316 (1999), aff’d, 305 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2002);
Salem et al., supra note 132, at 737–38.
139. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research, 131 S. Ct. 704, 714 (2011).
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Like most regulatory agencies, however, Treasury and the IRS
use a variety of interpretive formats in administering the tax laws.140
Two formats routinely used by Treasury and the IRS in administering
the I.R.C.—temporary regulations and IRB guidance—raise particular
questions regarding the force of law for both APA rulemaking and
Chevron deference purposes.
1. Temporary Treasury Regulations
In the ordinary course, the APA contemplates that an agency
seeking to promulgate legislative rules will issue a NOPR and will
give the public the opportunity to submit comments before the agency
adopts regulations that bind the actions of private parties.141 Treasury
frequently inverts this procedural sequence by issuing temporary
regulations without notice and comment.142 I.R.C. § 7805(e), adopted
in 1996, requires Treasury to accompany any temporary regulations
with a simultaneous NOPR and to finalize the regulations within
three years.143 The implied promise is that Treasury will consider the
comments received and may make modifications in adopting
replacement final rules, and Treasury typically does so. Meanwhile,
Treasury publishes its temporary regulations in the Federal Register
and Code of Federal Regulations, just like its final regulations. And in
the interim between issuance and finalization, taxpayers and their
advisers who fail to comply with temporary Treasury regulations face
penalties for their noncompliance: I.R.C. § 6662(b)(1) imposes a
penalty on taxpayers who underreport and underpay their taxes due
to “negligence or disregard of rules or regulations,”144 and I.R.C. §
6694(b) sanctions tax return preparers similarly.145 Since 1991,
140. Beyond Treasury regulations, former IRS Chief Counsel Donald Korb has identified at
least twenty-five different types of informal IRS interpretive formats ranging from published
rulings to oral communications. See Donald L. Korb, The Four R’s Revisited: Regulations,
Rulings, Reliance, and Retroactivity in the 21st Century: A View From Within, 46 DUQ. L. REV.
323, 323 (2008).
141. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c) (2006); see also discussion supra notes 27–35 and
accompanying text (describing APA procedural requirements for legislative rules).
142. See Michael Asimow, Public Participation in the Adoption of Temporary Tax
Regulations, 44 TAX LAW. 343, 343 (1991) (recognizing the Treasury’s use of temporary
regulations with only postpromulgation notice and comment); Hickman, supra note 15, at 1759–
60 (documenting Treasury’s use of temporary regulations in one-third of regulation projects
undertaken from 2004 to 2006).
143. I.R.C. § 7805(e) (2006).
144. I.R.C. § 6662(b)(1) (2006).
145. See I.R.C. § 6694(b)(1)–(2) (sanctioning tax return preparers who exhibit “a reckless or
intentional disregard of rules or regulations”).
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Treasury has interpreted these penalty provisions as extending to
temporary as well as final Treasury regulations.146 In short, Treasury
frequently begins its rulemaking with the legal equivalent of a final
rule rather than with merely a nonbinding proposal.
Treasury is not the only agency to use temporary regulations,
which other agencies and courts sometimes label interim-final
regulations.147 Courts and scholars have recognized interim-final
rulemaking as compliant with the APA only when the rules in
question qualify for an exception from the procedural requirements of
APA § 553; otherwise, the legal consensus holds that interim-final
rulemaking violates both the text and the spirit of the APA.148 Where
Treasury differs from other agencies is in its justification for departing
from the procedural sequence required by the APA’s text.
Agencies most often justify interim-final rulemaking by
claiming the good cause exception of APA § 553(b)(B).149 That
provision excuses agencies from engaging in prepromulgation notice
and comment “when the agency for good cause finds . . . that notice
and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or
contrary to the public interest.”150 The terms of APA § 553(b)(B)
require an agency claiming the exception to include both its finding of
good cause and its reasons for that finding “in the rules issued.”151
Hence, courts generally require agencies asserting the good cause
exception to do so expressly and contemporaneously,152 and with
146. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3 (2012).
147. See Administrative Conference of the United States, Notice; Adoption of
Recommendations, 60 Fed. Reg. 43,108, 43,111 (Aug. 18, 1995) (acknowledging interim-final
rulemaking by many agencies).
148. See, e.g., id. at 43,111–12 (“Courts generally have not allowed post-promulgation
comment as an alternative to the prepromulgation notice-and-comment process in situations
where no exemption is justified.”); Michael Asimow, Interim-Final Rules: Making Haste Slowly,
51 ADMIN. L. REV. 703, 717, 725–26 (1999) (observing that, absent a legal exception from APA
notice and comment requirements, “a rule adopted with post- rather than pre-adoption notice
and comment is procedurally invalid”).
149. See Administrative Conference of the United States, Notice; Adoption of
Recommendations, 60 Fed. Reg. at 43,111.
150. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) (2006).
151. Id.
152. See, e.g., Buschmann v. Schweiker, 676 F.2d 352, 356–57 (9th Cir. 1982) (requiring
good cause claim and justification to be included with new regulations); Bohner v. Daniels, 243
F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1176 (D. Or. 2003) (holding “good cause” exception inapplicable because it was
not invoked or justified in statement accompanying the regulation); see also 1 CHARLES H. KOCH,
JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4.13[1] (3d ed. 2010) (“An agency cannot claim the
‘good cause’ exemption for the first time after its procedures have been challenged in court. It
must invoke the exemption at the time of rulemaking and explain why it needs to bypass APA
procedures.”); cf. Consumer Energy Council of Am. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 673 F.2d
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specificity and particularity.153 As for what constitutes good cause,
courts tend to be skeptical of generic assertions of a need for
immediate guidance.154 Instead, courts generally limit the scope of the
exception to truly unusual circumstances, such as when public safety
is threatened or advance notice of a rule might undermine its
application.155 Courts often conclude after the fact that agencies’
claims of good cause for promulgating temporary or interim-final rules
are inadequate.156 Where agencies assert the good cause exception in
good faith and offer postpromulgation notice and comment with an
open mind, the Administrative Conference of the United States has
encouraged courts to be lenient.157 On some occasions, however, courts
have rejected even final regulations with temporary origins for the
irregularity of the agency’s procedures.158
Treasury, by contrast, typically does not rely upon the good
cause exception to justify its use of temporary regulations.159 In fact,
Treasury rarely offers any contemporaneous justification at all for its
claims that its regulations are exempt from APA procedural
425, 447 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (requiring contemporaneous explanation of rationale supporting good
cause claim).
153. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Evans, 316 F.3d 904, 912 (9th Cir. 2003)
(requiring “context-specific analysis”); Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d 732, 746 (2d Cir. 1995) (“A mere
recitation that good cause exists, coupled with a desire to provide immediate guidance, does not
amount to good cause.”).
154. See, e.g., Evans, 316 F.3d at 912 (finding good cause assertion based on “generic” claims
regarding the “complexity of data collection and time constraints” to be inadequate); Cal-Almond,
Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 14 F.3d 429, 441–42 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Riverbend Farms, Inc. v.
Madigan, 958 F.2d 1479 (9th Cir. 1992)) (rejecting good cause assertion for lack of specificity).
But see Or. Trollers Ass’n v. Gutierrez, 452 F.3d 1104, 1125 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that
“habitual invocation” of good cause exception was not improper so long as specific support was
provided); Methodist Hosp. of Sacramento v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 1225, 1236–37 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(holding that strict deadlines and special procedures justified application of “good cause”
exception).
155. See, e.g., Mack Trucks, Inc. v. EPA, 682 F.3d 87, 93–95 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (describing
circumstances justifying good cause claims); James Kim, For a Good Cause: Reforming the Good
Cause Exception to Notice and Comment Rulemaking Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 18
GEO. MASON L. REV. 1045, 1053–58 (2011) (summarizing cases in which courts upheld agency
assertions of good cause).
156. See, e.g., Evans, 316 F.3d at 906, 912 (rejecting agency’s good cause explanation as
insufficiently context specific); see also KOCH, supra note 152, § 4.14 (recognizing a trend toward
greater judicial scrutiny of agency explanations).
157. See Administrative Conference of the United States, Notice; Adoption of
Recommendations, 60 Fed. Reg. 43,108-02, 43,112 (Aug. 18, 1995) (recommending a finding of
harmless error “[w]here an agency has used post-promulgation comment procedures, responded
to significant adverse comments and ratified or modified the rule as appropriate”).
158. See discussion infra Part III.B.1. and accompanying text.
159. See Hickman, supra note 15, at 1750 (documenting claims of good cause in fifteen of
eighty-four Treasury regulation projects utilizing temporary regulations).
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requirements.160 When Treasury does assert the good cause exception,
it typically offers only a generalized, boilerplate assertion that its
regulations “are necessary to provide taxpayers with immediate
guidance.”161 In litigation over the validity of temporary Treasury
regulations, Treasury has not attempted belatedly to rely upon the
good cause exception.
Instead, the government’s principal defense against
accusations that its temporary regulations violate the APA has been
that most of its regulations are exempt as interpretative rules.
Treasury and the IRS historically have taken the position that only
specific authority Treasury regulations are legislative rules, that
general authority Treasury regulations are interpretative rules
exempt from APA notice and comment requirements, and that most
Treasury regulations are issued under general authority.162 Although
the Supreme Court in Mayo did not address the legislative versus
interpretative characterization of general authority Treasury
regulations, the Court did reject the specific versus general authority
distinction in concluding that such regulations carry the force of law
for Chevron purposes.163 Since the Mayo decision, the IRS has
amended the Internal Revenue Manual (“IRM”) to acknowledge that
at least some general authority regulations may be legislative rules.164
160. See id. at 1778–82 (describing patterns of good cause claims in Treasury regulations).
161. See, e.g., Portability of a Deceased Spousal Unused Exclusion Amount, 77 Fed. Reg.
36,150-01, 36,156 (June 18, 2012) (“These regulations are necessary to provide immediate
guidance . . . .”); Amendments to the Section 7216 Regulations-Disclosure or Use of Information
by Preparers of Returns, 75 Fed. Reg. 48-01, 51 (Jan. 4, 2010) (“These regulations are necessary
to provide tax return preparers and taxpayers with immediate guidance . . . .”); Guidance Under
Section 1502; Amendment of Matching Rule for Certain Gains on Member Stock, 73 Fed. Reg.
12,265-01, 12,267 (Mar. 7, 2008) (“The regulations are necessary to provide immediate guidance
and relief to taxpayers . . . .”); see also INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 14, §
32.1.5.4.7.5.1(7)–(8) (instructing IRS personnel to justify good clause claims based on “the need
for immediate guidance”).
162. See Hickman, supra note 15, at 1729 n.9, 1749 (documenting official IRS position and
pattern of disclaimers regarding APA applicability in preambles of Treasury regulations, and
tracing to IRM instruction regarding interpretative rules).
163. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 713–14
(2011).
164. See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 14, § 32.1.1.2.7 (amending the IRM as of
September 23, 2011, to read, “Legislative rules are required when Congress simply provided an
end result, without any guidance as to how to achieve the desired goal or when a statutory
provision does not provide adequate authority for the regulatory action taken.”); Id. § 32.1.1.2.8
(amending the IRM as of September 23, 2011, to recognize that “[w]hether a regulation is
promulgated under a specific grant of authority in the Internal Revenue Code does not govern
whether the regulation is interpretative or legislative,” and providing standards for classification
of regulations). For several years prior to these recent amendments, the IRM indicated only that
“most IRS/Treasury regulations are interpretative, and therefore not subject to” APA rulemaking
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Nevertheless, in the course of actual rulemaking, Treasury routinely
continues to assert the inapplicability of APA procedures.165
In recent litigation, the government has claimed additionally
that I.R.C. § 7805(e) authorizes Treasury’s issuance of temporary
regulations with only postpromulgation notice and comment. When
Treasury issues a temporary regulation, I.R.C. § 7805(e)(1) requires
Treasury to issue a corresponding notice of proposed rulemaking.166
I.R.C. § 7805(e)(2) in turn sunsets temporary regulations after three
years, thus setting a time frame within which Treasury must complete
APA notice-and-comment rulemaking to finalize any temporary
regulation it issues and wishes to retain.167 The government
characterizes these provisions as a congressionally authorized, taxspecific exception from prepromulgation notice and comment for
temporary Treasury regulations; according to the government, to hold
otherwise would be to deprive I.R.C. § 7805(e) of any meaning.168
The merits of the government’s interpretation of I.R.C. §
7805(e) are arguably tangential to this Article’s consideration of the
force of law question. Nevertheless, some evaluation of I.R.C. § 7805(e)
here is warranted, if only to demonstrate why the force of law question
matters for the procedural validity of temporary Treasury regulations.
The APA is only a statute, and Congress may and often does
alter APA procedural requirements in specific instances. But Congress
has also instructed the courts that another statute “may not be held to
supersede or modify” APA rulemaking requirements “except to the

requirements. See Hickman, supra note 15, at 1729 n.9, 1736 n.45 (documenting IRM statements
prior to recent amendments).
165. See, e.g., Public Inspection of Material Relating to Tax Exempt Organizations, T.D.
9581, 77 Fed. Reg. 12,202-01, 12,203 (Feb. 29, 2012) (claiming APA § 553(b) inapplicable to
regulations issued under I.R.C. § 7805 general authority); Rewards and Awards for Information
Relating to Violations of Internal Revenue Laws, T.D. 9580, 77 Fed. Reg. 10,370-01, 10,371 (Feb.
22, 2012) (same); Foreign Tax Credit Splitting Events, T.D. 9577, 77 Fed. Reg. 8127-01, 8134
(Feb. 14, 2012) (same); see also Source of Income from Qualified Fails Charges, T.D. 9579, 77
Fed. Reg. 9846-01, 9846 (Feb. 21, 2012) (claiming same for regulation citing both specific and
general authority).
166. See I.R.C. § 7805(e)(1) (2006) (“Any temporary regulation issued by the Secretary shall
also be issued as a proposed regulation.”).
167. See § 7805(e)(2) (“Any temporary regulation shall expire within 3 years after the date of
issuance of such regulation.”).
168. See Brief for the United States, United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S.
Ct. 1836 (2011) (No. 11-139), 2011 WL 5591822, at *29 (citing I.R.C. § 7805(e) as “granting the
Treasury Department authority to issue temporary regulations”); Brief for the Appellant,
Intermountain Ins. Serv. of Vail, LLC v. United States, 650 F.3d 691 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (No. 101204), 2010 WL 6210551, at *50–52 (“If the absence of notice and comment could deprive
temporary regulations of validity, then § 7805(e) is meaningless.”).
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extent that it does so expressly.”169 The courts have generally “looked
askance at agencies’ attempts to avoid the standard notice and
comment procedures” and have construed supposed statutory
exceptions from APA § 553 narrowly.170 Thus, judicially recognized
statutory authorizations to promulgate temporary or interim-final
regulations tend to be more explicit than I.R.C. § 7805(e). For
example, the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 provided
that the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) “shall publish in the
Federal Register an initial fee schedule and associated collection
process as an interim final rule.”171
Moreover, the more straightforward reading of the text of
I.R.C. § 7805(e) harmonizes with APA § 553, rather than setting them
at odds. APA § 553 expressly permits Treasury, like all agencies, to
issue temporary regulations without public notice and opportunity for
comment so long as it can demonstrate good cause or the applicability
of one of the other exceptions provided therein. I.R.C. § 7805(e), by
contrast, contains no authorizing language, but rather speaks in terms
of the consequences should Treasury and the IRS choose to issue
temporary regulations—specifically, any temporary regulation “shall
also be issued as a proposed regulation” and “shall expire within 3
years.”172 In other words, I.R.C. § 7805(e): acknowledges that
Treasury, like other agencies, has the power to and sometimes does
adopt temporary regulations without public notice and comment;
assumes that Treasury, like other agencies, does so validly within the
parameters established by the APA § 553; but then imposes additional
requirements on Treasury to issue a NOPR and finalize the regulation
before it expires.173
Reading I.R.C. § 7805(e) as limiting Treasury’s authority in
this way, rather than expanding it as the government suggests, is
consistent with the circumstances driving the provision’s enactment.
Congress adopted I.R.C. § 7805(e) in 1988 as part of the Taxpayer Bill
of Rights. Treasury had only started issuing temporary regulations
without prepromulgation notice and comment regularly in the
169. 5 U.S.C. § 559 (2006).
170. Lake Carriers’ Ass’n v. EPA, 652 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Asiana Airlines v.
FAA, 134 F.3d 393, 396 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).
171. Pub. L. No. 104-264, § 273(a), 110 Stat. 3213 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 45301(b)(2)
(2006)); see also Asiana Airlines, 134 F.3d at 398 (recognizing this language as exempting FAA
regulations from prepromulgation notice-and-comment rulemaking).
172. I.R.C. § 7805(e).
173. See Intermountain Ins. Serv. of Vail, LLC v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 211, 245 (2010) (Halpern
& Holmes, J.J., concurring) (adopting this reasoning); see also Asimow, supra note 142, at 363
(advocating this reading of I.R.C. § 7805(e)).
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1980s.174 Then, as now, Treasury maintained that most of its
regulations were exempt from APA § 553 notice and comment
requirements as interpretative rules. Nevertheless, until the 1980s,
Treasury routinely used notice and comment procedures in adopting
its regulations. According to Michael Asimow, Congress’s primary
concern in adopting I.R.C. § 7805(e) was the sizeable number of
temporary Treasury regulations that had languished on the books for
several years with no indication of when or whether Treasury might
finalize them using public notice and comment.175 Wanting Treasury
to use notice and comment, and taking at face value Treasury’s claim
that most of its regulations were exempt from notice and comment as
interpretative rules, Congress contemplated language eliminating or
restricting the interpretative rule exception in the tax context.176
Ultimately, Congress chose instead to require postpromulgation notice
and comment within three years and to avoid wreaking havoc on the
tax system by grandfathering any then-existing temporary Treasury
regulations. Regardless, this historical context further supports the
conclusion that Congress adopted the requirements of I.R.C. § 7805(e)
as additions to rather than subtractions from the procedures of APA §
553.177
The government’s recent reliance on I.R.C. § 7805(e) as
authorizing
temporary
Treasury
regulations
with
only
postpromulgation notice and comment is interesting because it seems
implicitly to recognize that the APA otherwise would require Treasury
to follow the traditional procedural sequence at least more often than
it does. After all, if Treasury is correct that most of its regulations are
interpretative, then Congress would have no need to adopt I.R.C. §
7805(e) to authorize temporary Treasury regulations. Courts thus far
have avoided reaching any conclusions regarding the interplay of APA
§ 553 and I.R.C. § 7805(e). As a matter of litigation strategy, the
government is wise to hedge its bets with alternative arguments. Still,
in the only published opinion to address the issue squarely—a
concurring opinion in Intermountain Insurance Service of Vail, LLC v.

174. See Asimow, supra note 142, at 343 (linking temporary Treasury regulations to the
1980s); Hickman, supra note 15, at 1797 (describing the evolution of Treasury’s use of temporary
regulations).
175. See Asimow, supra note 142, at 362–64 (documenting the history of § 7805(e)); see also
Salem et al., supra note 132, at 735 (2004) (recognizing same); Juan F. Vasquez, Jr. & Peter A.
Lowy, Challenging Temporary Treasury Regulations, 3 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 248, 254 (2003)
(describing similar reasons for adopting I.R.C. § 7805(e)).
176. See Asimow, supra note 142, at 362–63 (tracing legislative drafts).
177. See id. at 364 (reaching this conclusion).
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Commissioner—Judges Halpern and Holmes of the United States Tax
Court expressly rejected Treasury’s interpretation of I.R.C. § 7805(e)
as inconsistent with the plain text of that provision and as contrary to
congressional intent regarding the APA.178
Which leads the discussion back to whether general authority
Treasury regulations could be interpretative rules. Assuming that
courts find the government’s interpretation of I.R.C. § 7805(e)
unpersuasive, and recognizing that Treasury rarely claims good cause,
the only exception remaining for most temporary Treasury regulations
is that for interpretative rules. Again, the original basis for Treasury’s
claim that most of its regulations are interpretative rested in the
distinction between specific versus general rulemaking authority.179
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s rejection in Mayo of this divide
for Chevron purposes, and its own concessions in the Internal Revenue
Manual,180 the government in litigation has continued to maintain
that regulations issued pursuant to I.R.C. § 7805(a) general
authority—whether temporary or final—are per se interpretative.181
In addition to that argument, the government sometimes contends
that the temporary Treasury regulations at issue merely clarify and
thus interpret existing law—avoiding the force of law phraseology and
ignoring altogether, in favor of fuzzier rhetoric, the standards that
administrative law scholars would recognize.182 In other briefs, the
178. See Intermountain, 134 T.C. at 245–46 (Halpern & Holmes, J.J., concurring).
179. See supra note 162 and accompanying text (explaining Treasury’s position regarding
specific versus general authority regulations).
180. See supra note 164 and accompanying text (describing changes to the Internal Revenue
Manual).
181. See, e.g., Brief for the Appellee, Northrop Corp. Emp. Ins. Benefits Plan Master Trust v.
United States, 467 F. App’x 886 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (No. 2011-5125), 2011 WL 7038432, at *69–70
(arguing that Treas. Reg. § 1.512(a)-5T was an interpretative regulation exempt from notice and
comment because it was issued under I.R.C. § 7805(a) general authority); Combined Answering
and Reply Brief for the United States, Bemont Investments, L.L.C. ex rel Tax Matters Partner v.
United States, 679 F.3d 339 (5th Cir. 2012) (No. 10-41132), 2011 WL 2828208, at *53–55
(“Further supporting the IRS’s characterization of the regulations as interpretive is the fact that
they were issued pursuant to § 7805(a) . . . . Regulations issued pursuant to that general
authority generally have been viewed as interpretive.”); Reply Brief for the Appellant,
Wilmington Partners L.P. v. Comm’r, No. 10-4183 (2d Cir. May 11, 2011), 2011 WL 2113367, at
*25–26 (“Interpretive regulations are exempt from the APA’s notice-and-comment requirements.
. . . Regulations promulgated, as here, pursuant to the IRS’s general rule-making authority,
I.R.C. § 7805(a), are interpretive.”); Reply Brief for the Appellant, Reynolds Properties, L.P. v.
Comm’r, Nos. 10-72406 & 10-73376 (9th Cir. filed Aug. 5, 2010), 2011 WL 1653618 at *23
(“Interpretive regulations are exempt from the APA’s notice-and-comment requirements. . . .
Regulations promulgated, as here, pursuant to the IRS’s general rule-making authority, I.R.C. §
7805(a), are interpretive.”).
182. See, e.g., Brief for the Appellant, Beard v. Comm’r, 633 F.3d 616 (7th Cir. 2011) (No. 093741), 2010 WL 3950613, at *34–38 (citing circuit precedent for proposition that “[a]n
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government has argued that a regulation can affect taxpayer rights
and obligations without automatically being legislative in character,
again avoiding reference to American Mining Congress and the force of
law.183
Most of the relatively limited jurisprudence that addresses this
question predates Mayo, and courts in most of those cases accepted
Treasury’s characterization of general authority regulations as
interpretative, either arguendo or without any discussion at all, in
considering the extent to which the regulations at issue were entitled
to judicial deference.184 In Abbott Laboratories v. United States, the
Court of Federal Claims rejected the interpretative rule label for a
temporary Treasury regulation, notwithstanding Treasury’s original
characterization of the regulation as interpretative, but largely
because Treasury also cited a specific authority grant when it issued
the regulation.185 In the Intermountain case mentioned above, a
majority of the United States Tax Court’s judges expressly declined to
resolve whether or not the general authority temporary regulation at
issue was legislative or interpretative, or whether it qualified for
Chevron deference, and instead invalidated the regulation on other
grounds.186 Writing in concurrence, however, Judges Halpern and
Holmes rejected the government’s claim that a temporary Treasury
regulation was interpretative and concluded instead that the rule was
legislative and thus invalid for its lack of prepromulgation notice and
comment. Halpern and Holmes dismissed the distinction between
specific authority and general authority as irrelevant.187 Instead,
citing American Mining Congress, Halpern and Holmes maintained
interpretive rule is a statement as to what the administrative officer thinks the statute or
regulation means” and arguing that, “[s]ince the regulations are a clarification of existing law,
they are ‘interpretive’ under the APA, and notice and comment is not required.”); Reply Brief for
the Appellant, Burks v. United States, 633 F.3d 347 (5th Cir. 2011) (No. 09-60827), 2010 WL
3050316, at *16–17 (citing and quoting from various circuit court cases to justify interpretative
rule characterization).
183. See, e.g., Brief for the Appellant, Beard v. Comm’r, supra note 182, at *35–38 (“A rule
can be interpretive even though it affects the parties’ rights and obligations.”).
184. See, e.g., Boeing Co. v. United States, 537 U.S. 437, 447–48 (2003) (“Even if we regard
the challenged regulation as interpretative because it was promulgated under § 7805(a)’s general
rulemaking grant rather than a specific grant of authority, we must still treat the regulation
with deference.” (emphasis added)); Estate of Gerson v. Comm’r, 507 F.3d 435, 437–38 (6th Cir.
2007) (labeling general authority Treasury regulation “interpretive” without discussion of label);
Stobie Creek Invs., LLC v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 636, 668–69 (2008) (recognizing the specific
versus general distinction in the course of discussing deference).
185. 84 Fed. Cl. 96, 109–10 & n.22 (2008).
186. Intermountain Ins. Serv. of Vail, LLC v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 211, 220–21 (2010).
187. See id. at 240 (Halpern & Holmes, J.J., concurring) (“ ‘[I]nterpretive’ means something
different in administrative law.”).
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that all Treasury regulations carry the force of law because Congress
imposed penalties upon taxpayers who fail to comply with them,
whether those regulations are temporary or final, or issued under
specific or general authority.188 Considering the four American Mining
Congress factors,189 Halpern and Holmes reasoned further that
Treasury clearly acts with the force of law when it invokes the general
authority of I.R.C. § 7805(a) in adopting temporary Treasury
regulations.190
Meanwhile, the government routinely insists that temporary
Treasury regulations carry the force and effect of law for purposes of
Chevron deference.191 While, again, the Supreme Court in Mayo
concluded that Treasury regulations issued with notice and comment
carry the force of law and are Chevron eligible, post-Mead
jurisprudence concerning temporary Treasury regulations is relatively
sparse, and the circuit courts that have offered guidance thus far are
divided. After Mead but prior to Mayo, in Hospital Corporation of
America v. Commissioner, the Sixth Circuit granted Chevron
deference to a temporary Treasury regulation irrespective of its lack of
notice and comment, although the court recognized, without deciding,
that such regulations might violate the APA.192 Post-Mayo, in Beard v.
Commissioner, the Seventh Circuit expressed in dicta its inclination to
extend Chevron review to temporary Treasury regulations, given that
the Supreme Court does not require notice-and-comment rulemaking
for Chevron deference.193 By contrast, in Burks v. United States, the

188. See id. at 240–41.
189. See supra text accompanying notes 76–83 (summarizing American Mining Congress
factors).
190. See Intermountain, 134 T.C. at 243–44 (Halpern & Holmes, J.J., concurring)
(concluding that regulations issued under I.R.C. § 7805(a) “carry the force of law, because the
Code imposes penalties for failing to follow them,” and that, by relying on I.R.C. § 7805(a) in
promulgating the regulations at issue, “the Secretary explicitly invoked his legislative
authority”).
191. See, e.g., Brief for the Appellee, Northrop Corp. Emp. Ins. Benefits Plan Master Trust v.
United States, supra note 181, at *70–71 (claiming that temporary Treasury regulation was an
interpretative rule even though it carried the force of law for Chevron purposes); Brief for the
Appellant, JT USA, LP v. Comm’r, No. 12-70037 (9th Cir. filed Jan. 5, 2012), 2012 WL 993020, at
*39 (claiming Chevron deference for a temporary Treasury regulation).
192. See 348 F.3d 136, 144–45 & n.3 (6th Cir. 2003) (acknowledging but declining to address
“the issue of whether the Administrative Procedure Act requires notice and comment procedures
before Treasury may promulgate temporary interpretive regulations that make substantive
choices among permissible statutory interpretations”).
193. See 633 F.3d 616, 623 (7th Cir. 2011) (explaining that “we would have been inclined to
grant the temporary regulation Chevron deference” because “we have previously given deference
to interpretive Treasury regulations issued with notice-and-comment procedures” and “the
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Fifth Circuit strongly suggested that Treasury’s failure to use
prepromulgation notice and comment in issuing temporary
regulations could make them ineligible for Chevron deference.194
Courts are likewise divided regarding the degree of deference due to
final Treasury regulations with temporary origins, with the D.C.
Circuit and the Federal Circuit suggesting that Treasury’s use of
notice and comment in promulgating final regulations mooted
taxpayers’ complaints regarding the procedural validity of the earlier
temporary regulations,195 and the Fifth Circuit contending
postpromulgation notice and comment “is not an acceptable substitute
for pre-promulgation notice and comment.”196
2. IRB Guidance
IRB
guidance
documents—revenue
rulings,
revenue
procedures, and notices published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin—
raise the same issues as temporary Treasury regulations, for largely
the same reasons. The IRS defines revenue rulings formally as
“interpretation[s]” and “conclusion[s] of the Service on how the law is
applied to a specific set of facts.”197 Notices are “public
pronouncement[s] by the Service that may contain guidance that
involves substantive interpretations of” the tax laws, though their
original purpose in contrast to revenue rulings was to allow the IRS to
provide immediate, informal guidance as needed and appropriate.198
Finally, the IRS has described revenue procedures as “statements of
practice and procedure issued primarily for internal use.”199 Although
both Treasury and the IRS recognize that revenue procedures may
“affect[] the rights or duties of taxpayers or other members of the

Supreme Court has stated that the absence of notice-and-comment procedures is not dispositive
to the finding of Chevron deference”), vacated on other grounds, 132 S. Ct. 2099 (2012).
194. See Burks v. United States, 633 F.3d 347, 360 n.9 (5th Cir. 2011) (distinguishing
temporary Treasury regulations from those at issue in Mayo).
195. Grapevine Imports, Ltd. v. United States, 636 F.3d 1368, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2011);
Intermountain, 650 F.3d at 709.
196. Burks, 633 F.3d at 360 n.9.
197. Rev. Proc. 2012-4, 2012-1 I.R.B. 125, app. E § 3.07. Earlier IRS documents used a
slightly different definition of revenue rulings as “official interpretation[s].” E.g., Rev. Proc. 8914, 1989-1 C.B. 814, § 3.01; Rev. Proc. 86-15, 1986-1 C.B. 544, § 3.01; Rev. Proc. 78-24, 1978-2
C.B. 503, § 3.01. Treas. Reg. § 601.601(d)(2)(i)(a) still uses the term “official interpretation” in
describing revenue rulings.
198. See, e.g., Korb, supra note 140, at 339 (emphasizing relative informality of notices and
consequent suitability for providing immediate guidance).
199. Rev. Proc. 55-1, 1955-2 C.B. 897, § 3.
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public under the Code and related statutes,”200 former IRS Chief
Counsel Donald Korb has suggested that revenue procedures “would
generally not be useful to taxpayers in planning transactions or
determining positions to be taken on returns.”201 The IRS almost
never seeks public comments in issuing any of these guidance
documents; on the rare occasions when the IRS does seek public input,
it does not purport to comply with APA procedural requirements.
As originally envisioned by the IRS, and as widely regarded by
tax practitioners, these documents would seem to be precisely the sort
of informal guidance that one would expect to be exempt from noticeand-comment rulemaking and generally ineligible for Chevron
deference. Treasury regulations and the Internal Revenue Bulletin
state, as they have for decades, that these guidance documents “do not
have the force and effect of Treasury Department Regulations . . . .”202
The courts generally recognize IRB guidance as “authoritative,”203 but
in 1965, in Dixon v. United States, the Supreme Court concluded that
“[t]he Commissioner’s rulings have only such force as Congress
chooses to give them, and Congress has not given them the force of
law.”204 It is possible that one or another IRB guidance document
might arguably have possessed sufficient practical binding effect to
slip over the legislative rule line, particularly under the broad
substantial impact test.205 For example, Simon v. Eastern Kentucky
Welfare Rights Organization, addressed by the Supreme Court in
1976, originated as an APA procedural challenge against a revenue

200. Treas. Reg. § 601.601(d)(2)(i)(b) (2012); see also Rev. Proc. 89-14, 1989-1 C.B. 814, §
3.02 (adopting a similar definition).
201. Korb, supra note 140, at 338; see also Mitchell Rogovin, The Four R’s: Regulations,
Rulings, Reliance and Retroactivity: A View from Within, 43 TAXES 756, 764 n.40 (1965)
(explaining that the Revenue Procedure program was established to publicize primarily internal
statements of practice and procedure relevant to taxpayers and to inform taxpayers of certain
audit procedures); Salem et al., supra note 132, at 730 (noting that the IRS initially
“distinguished revenue procedures from revenue rulings, the latter pertaining to ‘substantive tax
law,’ as opposed to ‘internal practices or procedures’ ”).
202. E.g., Treas. Reg. § 601.601(d)(2)(v)(d); 2008-2 C.B. ii, Introduction; 2012-26 I.R.B.
Introduction.
203. E.g., Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 103 Fed. Cl. 111, 141 (2012) (quoting
Reliant Energy Inc. v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 302, 306 n.6 (1999)).
204. 381 U.S. 68, 73 (1965); see also Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 132 (1947)
(characterizing IRS rulings published in the IRB as lacking “the force and effect of” Treasury
regulations).
205. See generally Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances,
Manuals, and the Like—Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J.
1311 (1992) (examining agency use of nonlegislative rules to practically if not legally govern
regulated party behavior, and listing numerous examples).
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ruling for lack of notice and comment,206 although the D.C. Circuit
rejected the claim after the taxpayer conceded that the ruling lacked
“independent binding effect” on either taxpayers or the court,207 and
the Supreme Court dismissed the case on standing grounds.208
Nevertheless, for a long time, the United States Tax Court’s
description of IRB guidance as “merely opinions of a lawyer in the
agency” was widely shared.209
Two aspects of contemporary IRB guidance documents shift
them squarely into the force of law gray zone with respect to both APA
procedural requirements and Chevron eligibility. First, the IRS’s
utilization of IRB guidance documents has evolved considerably, to a
point where it is often easier to declare that they create law rather
than merely interpret existing law. Revenue rulings were always
substantive—for example, explaining how particular statutory and
regulatory provisions applied to a particular set of hypothetical facts
and circumstances;210 or acknowledging a particular source of
ambiguity in the I.R.C., articulating various guiding principles that
the IRS considered relevant in resolving the ambiguity, and providing
examples demonstrating the application of those principles.211 The IRS
continues to enforce past revenue rulings through litigation, but its
use of these documents has declined substantially, and many that are
issued merely communicate periodic adjustments to federal interest
rates and adjustable percentages for various I.R.C. sections.212
Meanwhile, many revenue procedures are now significantly more
substantive than in the past. Many revenue procedures still offer
instructions for accomplishing particular filing tasks or
communicating with the IRS.213 But the IRS also routinely uses
206. See 426 U.S. 26, 33–34 (1976) (summarizing the taxpayer’s claims regarding Revenue
Ruling 69-545).
207. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278, 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
208. Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 429 U.S. 26, 44–45 (1976).
209. Lunsford v. Comm’r, 117 T.C. 159, 174 n.6 (2001); see also McLaulin v. Comm’r, 115
T.C. 255, 263 (2000) (“We generally treat a revenue ruling as merely the Commissioner’s
litigating position not entitled to any judicial deference or precedential weight.”); Philips
Petroleum Co. v. Comm’r, 101 T.C. 78, 99 n.17 (1993) (noting that revenue rulings, revenue
procedures, and notices “do not have the force of law, are merely statements of the
Commissioner’s position, and are entitled to no special deference in this Court”).
210. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 14, 1953-1 C.B. 348; Rev. Rul. 9, 1953-1 C.B. 468; Rev. Rul. 7, 1953-1
C.B. 224.
211. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 12, 1953-1 C.B. 290; Rev. Rul. 8, 1953-1 C.B. 300.
212. See Hickman, supra note 17, at 244–46 (analyzing current revenue ruling utilization
patterns).
213. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 2012-1, 2012-1 I.R.B. 1; Rev. Proc. 2012-2, 2012-1 I.R.B. 92; Rev.
Proc. 2012-3, 2012-1 I.R.B. 113.

2b. Hickman_PAGE (Do Not Delete)

2013]

UNPACKING THE FORCE OF LAW

3/25/2013 3:45 PM

505

revenue procedures to establish safe harbors or other criteria for
satisfying the requirements of various substantive provisions.214 In
addition, the IRS has issued several revenue procedures identifying
specific transactions as not being reportable transactions, meaning
that taxpayers will not be penalized for failing to disclose their
participation in such transactions on their tax returns under I.R.C. §
6707A and Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4.215 Similarly, while the IRS initially
began to use the notice format in the 1980s to communicate minor
matters to taxpayers, now the IRS publishes notices to accomplish at
least one particularly significant substantive function. Whereas the
IRS uses the revenue procedure format to notify taxpayers of
transactions that are not reportable under I.R.C. § 6707A and Treas.
Reg. § 1.6011-4, the IRS has issued numerous notices declaring
particular transactions to be “listed transactions” that are thus, by
regulatory definition, reportable.216 Courts may ultimately uphold the
legality of a listed transaction,217 but the label represents at least a
preliminary communication by the IRS that it considers the
transaction to be abusive. Yet while these notices tend to provide
factual descriptions of the transactions at issue, they offer little legal
analysis to explain or support their designation. Meanwhile, taxpayers
engaging in listed transactions must file detailed disclosure
statements with the IRS or face substantial financial penalties.218
Beyond the content of IRB guidance, the legal significance that
Treasury and the IRS assign to these documents has changed. For
example, I.R.C. § 6662 imposes penalties on taxpayers who
underreport and underpay their taxes due to “negligence or disregard
of rules or regulations.”219 In 1991, Treasury adopted language in
Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3 defining “rules and regulations” for this
214. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 2009-10, 2009-2 I.R.B. 267; Rev. Proc. 2008-43, 2008-30 I.R.B. 186;
Rev. Proc. 2008-26, 2008-21 I.R.B. 1014; Rev. Proc. 2008-25, 2008-13 I.R.B. 686; Rev. Proc. 200816, 2008-10 I.R.B. 547; Rev. Proc. 2002-12, 2002-1 C.B. 374; see also Kathryn Sedo & Katrina
Wessbecker, Should Courts Ever Give Deference to Revenue Procedures?, 134 TAX NOTES 225,
227–33 (2012) (offering additional examples of substantive revenue procedures).
215. See Rev. Proc. 2007-20, 2007-1 C.B. 517; Rev. Proc. 2004-68, 2004-2 C.B. 969; Rev. Proc.
2004-67, 2004-2 C.B. 967; Rev. Proc. 2004-66, 2004-2 C.B. 966.
216. See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 2008-111, 2008-2 C.B. 1299; I.R.S. Notice 2008-34, 2008-1 C.B.
645; I.R.S. Notice 2007-83, 2007-2 C.B. 960. A more complete list of transactions designated by
the IRS as abusive, including listed transactions and delisted transactions, is available on the
IRS website.
217. Treasury states explicitly that the listing of a transaction “shall not affect the legal
determination of whether the taxpayer’s treatment of the transaction is proper.” Treas. Reg. §
1.6011-4(a) (2012).
218. I.R.C. § 6707A (2006).
219. I.R.C. § 6662(b)(1).
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purpose as including “revenue rulings or notices (other than notices of
proposed rulemaking) issued by the Internal Revenue Service and
published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin” and indicated in the
preamble that revenue procedures “may or may not be treated as
‘rules or regulations’ depending on all facts and circumstances.”220
I.R.C. § 6694 similarly imposes penalties on professional tax advisers
who prepare tax returns that understate taxes due based on “a
reckless or intentional disregard of rules or regulations.”221 As with
I.R.C. § 6662, Treasury in 1991 adopted regulatory language
extending the definition of “rules and regulations” for this purpose to
include revenue rulings, notices, and some revenue procedures.222 In
short, taxpayers are potentially subject to underpayment penalties,
and tax professionals may face tax preparer penalties, should they
decline or otherwise fail to comply with legal interpretations that the
IRS articulates in IRB guidance documents. Finally, in 2004, Congress
adopted I.R.C. § 6707A, imposing hefty financial penalties (in addition
to those for underpayment of taxes) upon taxpayers who fail to
disclose their participation in “reportable transactions,” including but
not limited to “listed transactions,” on their tax returns.223 As noted
above, the IRS principally uses revenue procedures and notices to
communicate its conclusions regarding whether or not a particular
transaction falls within these categories.
Post-Mead, until the Mayo decision, the DOJ routinely argued
in tax cases that IRB guidance documents carry the force of law and
are entitled to Chevron deference.224 In making that argument, the
DOJ described IRB guidance documents as “official” agency
pronouncements, reviewed and issued by top agency officials and
published in the IRB, just like Treasury regulations.225 The DOJ
220. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(2) (2012); Accuracy-related Penalty, T.D. 8381, 56 Fed. Reg.
67,492-01, 67,494 (Dec. 31, 1991).
221. I.R.C. § 6694(b)(1)–(2).
222. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-3(e) (2012); Penalty on Income Tax Return Preparers Who
Understate Taxpayer’s Liability on a Federal Income Tax Return or a Claim for Refund, T.D.
8382, 56 Fed. Reg. 67,509-01, 67,513 (Dec. 31, 1991).
223. I.R.C. § 6707A(a)–(b) (imposing penalties of up to two hundred thousand dollars for
failure to disclose participation in a listed transaction and up to fifty thousand dollars for failure
to disclose participation in any other reportable transaction); American Jobs Creation Act of
2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357 § 811(a), 118 Stat. 1418 (adopting the new § 6707A).
224. E.g., Brief for the Appellee, Conopco, Inc. v. United States, supra note 20, at 59–60;
Brief for the Defendant-Appellant, Fortis, Inc. v. United States, supra note 20, at 42–43; Brief for
the Appellant (Final), Aeroquip-Vickers, Inc. v. Comm’r, supra note 20, at 31–32.
225. E.g., Brief for the Appellee, Conopco Inc. v. United States, supra note 20, at 59–60;
Brief for Defendant-Appellant, Fortis, Inc. v. United States, supra note 20, at 43; Reply Brief for
the Appellant at 24–25, Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Assoc. v. United States (Fed. Cir. 2004) (No. 03-5162),
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particularly described revenue rulings as “formal” rulings involving
“substantive tax law” and having precedential effect for the disposition
of other cases.226 In at least one case, the DOJ claimed that “[t]he only
material distinction” between Treasury regulations and revenue
rulings “is that the latter are not issued pursuant to notice-andcomment procedures.”227 In another brief, the DOJ claimed that the
revenue procedure at issue was eligible for Chevron deference because
it “contain[ed] not just procedural instructions, but rather a
substantive rule” that had “the force and effect of law”
notwithstanding its lack of notice and comment.”228
Post-Mayo, the DOJ publicly signaled its intent to stop seeking
Chevron deference for IRB guidance documents.229 To date, several
circuits have generally rejected Chevron deference for IRB guidance
documents, taking at face value IRS assertions that revenue rulings
lack “the force and effect of Treasury Department regulations,”230 and
also on the ground that IRB guidance documents lack notice and
comment—procedures that the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected
as required for Chevron eligibility.231 Other circuits, including the D.C.
Circuit, have deliberately left open which standard of review ought to

2004 WL 3763424 at *24–25; see also Brief for the Appellant at 27–28, Texaco Inc. v. United
States (9th Cir. 2008) (No. 06-16098), 2006 WL 3623262 (acknowledging that, like Treasury
regulations, revenue rulings are “published,” in addition to being “written and reviewed at the
same level of the IRS and the Department of Treasury”).
226. E.g., Brief for the Appellant at 58, Gen. Mills, Inc. v. United States (8th Cir. 2009) (No.
08-1638), 2008 WL 2505866 at *58 (quoting Treas. Reg. § 601.601(d)(2)(v)(a)); Brief for the
Appellee, Conopco Inc. v. United States, supra note 20, at 60 (quoting Treas. Reg. §
601.601(d)(2)(v)(a)); Brief for the Appellant at 39–40, USA Choice Internet Serv., LLC v. United
States (Fed. Cir. 2008) (No. 2007-5077), 2007 WL 1997157 (quoting Treas. Reg. §
601.601(d)(2)(v)(a)).
227. Brief for the Appellant, Texaco Inc. v. United States, supra note 225, at 28.
228. Reply Brief for the Appellant, Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Assoc. v. United States, supra note 225,
at 25.
229. See Sapirie, supra note 20, at 674 (reporting that the DOJ Tax Division appellate
section chief announced intent to stop seeking Chevron deference for revenue rulings and
revenue procedures).
230. Aeroquip-Vickers, Inc. v. Comm’r, 347 F.3d 173, 181 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Rev. Proc.
89-14, 1989-1 C.B. 814).
231. See, e.g., Kornman & Assocs. v. United States, 527 F.3d 443, 452–57 (5th Cir. 2008)
(rejecting Chevron deference for revenue rulings because they “are not promulgated pursuant to
the notice-and-comment procedures of the Administrative Procedures Act” and because “we
believe that the lack of notice-and-comment and the IRS’s own divergent treatment of treasury
regulations and revenue rulings is dispositive of the deference issue”); cf. Nelson v. Comm’r, 568
F.3d 662, 665 (8th Cir. 2009) (according revenue rulings Skidmore deference without further
analysis); Del Commercial Props., Inc. v. Comm’r, 251 F.3d 210, 214 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (same).
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apply to IRB guidance.232 In particular, the Ninth Circuit has reserved
the question repeatedly since Judge O’Scannlain, in a concurring
opinion in Tualatin Valley Builders Supply, Inc. v. United States,
opined that a revenue procedure was legally binding and thus Chevron
eligible.233 The Tualatin Valley decision predates the Supreme Court’s
decision in Mayo. But in 2012, in Taproot Administrative Services, Inc.
v. Commissioner, the Ninth Circuit reiterated its reservation
regarding the level of deference due to IRB guidance, notwithstanding
the government’s position on brief that Skidmore provided the
appropriate evaluative standard for a revenue ruling.234 Because
courts rather than litigants determine which standard of review
applies, the Justice Department’s shift away from claiming Chevron
deference for IRB guidance may not foreclose a potential future circuit
split on this issue.
Meanwhile, the IRS has claimed in litigation that IRB
guidance is nonlegislative and thus is exempt from APA notice-andcomment rulemaking requirements. The courts may not agree. In
particular, in Cohen v. United States, the D.C. Circuit considered the
justiciability of an APA challenge to Notice 2006-50, which designated
procedures for obtaining refunds of a defunct telephone excise tax.235
Most of the discussion in Cohen concerned other issues, including but
not limited to the meaning of the I.R.C.’s Anti-Injunction Act, 26
U.S.C. § 7421(a).236 Among other claims, however, the government
asserted that Notice 2006-50 was a policy statement that lacked the
force of law for APA purposes, and thus was not final agency action as

232. See, e.g., Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. United States, 431 F.3d 374, 379 (D.C. Cir.
2005) (“[A]lthough the parties discuss whether we should defer to Revenue Ruling 79-404
pursuant to [Chevron or Skidmore], we need not resolve that question.”); Am. Bankers Ins.
Group v. United States, 408 F.3d 1328, 1335 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[W]e need not determine the
proper level of deference to be given Revenue Ruling 79-404.”).
233. 522 F.3d 937, 945–46 (9th Cir. 2008) (O’Scannlain, J., specially concurring) (recognizing
circuit confusion regarding proper standard of review for IRB guidance documents and
concluding that the IRS revenue procedure at issue was entitled to Chevron deference); see also
Bluetooth SIG Inc. v. United States, 611 F.3d 617, 622 & n.6 (9th Cir. 2010) (acknowledging
Judge O’Scannlain’s special concurrence without resolving the open question); Texaco Inc. v.
United States, 528 F.3d 703, 711 & n.8 (9th Cir. 2008) (same).
234. 679 F.3d 1109, 1115–16 & n.14 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding open the question of whether
Skidmore deference or Chevron deference applies to revenue rulings as well as revenue
procedures).
235. Cohen v. United States, 599 F.3d 652, 652 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Final Brief for the Appellee
at 3–4, Cohen, 599 F.3d 652 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Nos. 08-5088, 08-5093 & 08-5174), 2009 WL
857437.
236. See Cohen, 599 F.3d at 652 (ordering briefing of four questions, three of which
concerned the Anti-Injunction Act).
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required for judicial review under the APA.237 A majority of the threejudge panel initially hearing the case concluded after some discussion
that Notice 2006-50 was reviewable as final agency action, calling it “a
binding standard” that “alters the legal obligations of service
providers charged with collecting excise taxes” and “changes
taxpayers’ rights and obligations,” and declaring that it “operates as a
substantive rule that binds the IRS, excise tax collectors, and
taxpayers.”238 While the rehearing en banc concerned different
questions, the majority of the court made a point of reiterating its
earlier finality conclusion: “Put simply, ‘Notice 2006-50 binds the IRS.’
”239 While the D.C. Circuit’s holding concerned the finality of Notice
2006-50 rather than its characterization as a legislative rule, on
remand the district court interpreted the D.C. Circuit’s decision in
Cohen as requiring the invalidation of Notice 2006-50 for its lack of
notice and comment.240 “Simply stated, because Notice 2006-50 is
binding, the defendant was required to abide by the APA’s notice-andcomment requirements, or to, alternatively, provide good-cause for not
doing so.”241
II. WRESTLING WITH THE DOCTRINE
Whether the issue is distinguishing legislative and
nonlegislative rules or ascertaining eligibility for Chevron deference,
the judicial rhetoric that accompanies the force of law concept reflects
considerable overlap. Where an agency employs notice-and-comment
rulemaking under clear congressional authority to adopt rules and
regulations, there is little doubt that the courts will treat the rule both
as legislative and as eligible for Chevron deference. An agency’s failure
to employ notice-and-comment rulemaking does not foreclose either
the possibility that the rule is legislative, and thus that the agency
should have used notice and comment, or that Chevron may apply.

237. Final Brief for the Appellee, supra note 235, at pt. II.C.1. Subsequently, before the D.C.
Circuit en banc, the government repackaged the same argument as relating to the APA’s
exclusion from judicial review those matters “committed to agency discretion,” citing 5 U.S.C. §
701(a)(2). En Banc Brief for the Appellee at 64, Cohen v. United States, 650 F.3d 717, 723 (D.C.
Cir. 2011) (Nos. 08-5088, 08-5093 & 08-5174), 2010 WL 3514351 at *64.
238. Cohen v. United States, 578 F.3d 1, 6–9 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
239. Cohen v. United States, 650 F.3d 717, 723 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quoting Cohen v.
United States, 578 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2009)).
240. In re Long-Distance Tel. Serv. Fed. Excise Tax Refund Lit., 853 F. Supp. 2d 138, 142–
43 (D.D.C. 2012).
241. Id. at 143 (citations omitted).
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Courts can and have applied the various tests articulated in Part I
above to reach all of these conclusions.
Yet, focusing too closely on the various steps, elements, and
factors of the standards outlined in Part I risks missing the point. As
the Supreme Court has made clear on various occasions, most notably
in Chrysler Corp. v. Brown and Mead, whether agency rules are
legislative and whether they are eligible for Chevron deference both
turn on evidence of a congressional delegation of power to act with
legal force and agency intent to utilize that authority. Cases like
American Mining Congress, Community Nutrition Institute, and
Mead—and the steps, elements, or factors they adopt—merely reflect
courts’ efforts to elaborate that force of law concept and to discern the
presence or absence of congressional delegation and agency intent
with respect thereto.
Extensive scholarly ink has been spilled criticizing courts’
existing standards for grappling with these questions. Much of the
criticism is aimed at the practical difficulties of applying the
delegation premise consistently, although commentators also
challenge the merits of the premise itself. Trying to resolve all the
problems with the delegation premise is beyond the scope of this
Article. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in particular shows no signs
of backing away from delegation. Hence, stepping back a bit to
contemplate delegation theory and its relationship to the tax laws
seems warranted. Without wholeheartedly embracing the delegation
premise as a normative matter, the following analysis at least
attempts to ground it a little in administrative law theory and to
apply it to the tax context.
A. The Limits of the “Short Cut”242
Administrative law scholars have criticized the standards
discussed in Part I for decades. Instead of trying to distinguish
between legislative and nonlegislative rules on the basis of what they
do,243 some scholars have suggested that courts instead should simply
accept an agency’s characterization of its own rules as evidenced by its

242. I borrow this language from David L. Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules,
and the Perils of the Short Cut, 120 YALE L.J. 276, 278–82 (2010), which discusses some of the
same issues addressed in this Article. I think, however, that I expand my use of the term beyond
what Franklin envisioned.
243. See supra text accompanying notes 52–61 (discussing emphasis of contemporary
standards for characterizing rules).
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decision whether to undertake notice-and-comment rulemaking.244
Thus, agency rules promulgated using notice and comment procedures
would be legislative, while agency interpretations advanced through
formats lacking those procedures would be interpretative rules or
policy statements—an approach that David Franklin recently dubbed
the “short cut.”245 Pre-Mead, Donald Elliott described this approach as
“pay me now, or pay me later,” with the understanding that an agency
that chose to avoid the scrutiny of notice and comment would have to
suffer closer inspection of its legal interpretations case by case
through judicial review of enforcement actions.246 In other words,
because nonlegislative rules lack binding force, an agency that chose
to forego notice and comment would need to “be prepared to support
the policy just as if the policy statement had never been issued.”247
More recently, Jacob Gerson has suggested that Mead only increases
the “pay later” burden by generally denying Chevron deference to
interpretative rules and policy statements.248 While not per se
embracing the short cut approach to distinguishing between
legislative and nonlegislative rules, John Manning has made a similar
observation regarding Mead: “By denying Chevron deference to
nonlegislative rules, the Court makes them nonbinding in practice.
Such a default position, moreover, meaningfully distinguishes
nonlegislative from legislative rules without the confusing form of
inquiry that direct judicial review of that distinction has thus far
entailed.”249
As both Gerson and Manning recognize, Mead does not
absolutely condition Chevron’s applicability upon the use of notice and

244. See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1490 (1992)
(contending that “a court should not go behind the objective terms of a statement of agency policy
to speculate about whether the statement was ‘really intended’ to bind the public”); William
Funk, When Is a “Rule” a Regulation? Marking a Clear Line Between Nonlegislative Rules and
Legislative Rules, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 659, 663 (2002) (advocating a “notice-and-comment test,”
which “is simply that any rule not issued after notice and comment is an interpretive rule or
statement of policy, unless it qualifies as a rule exempt from notice and comment on some other
basis”); Jacob E. Gersen, Legislative Rules Revisited, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1705, 1719 (2007)
(“Rather than asking whether a rule is legislative to answer whether notice and comment
procedures should have been used, courts should simply ask whether notice and comment
procedures were used.”); see also Franklin, supra note 242, at 289–94 (summarizing this
literature).
245. Franklin, supra note 242, at 279.
246. Elliott, supra note 244, at 1491.
247. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
248. See, e.g., Gersen, supra note 244, at 1720–21 (discussing Mead’s impact on the short
cut).
249. John F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 893, 940 (2004).
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comment.250 Most judicial opinions discussing Mead acknowledge the
same, although they also reflect uncertainty regarding exactly which
agency rules that lack notice and comment might nevertheless qualify
for Chevron deference. Nevertheless, lower courts on occasion have
seemed implicitly to follow a short cut approach to Mead by simply
extending or rejecting Chevron review based on the presence or
absence of public notice and comment without further inquiry.251
Putting it all together, therefore, one might envision an expanded
short cut as follows: if an agency uses notice-and-comment
rulemaking, then the resulting rule carries the force of law, is
legislative, and should be eligible for Chevron deference. If an agency
rule lacks notice and comment, then the rule lacks the force of law, is
nonlegislative, and should merit Skidmore’s greater scrutiny.
The simplicity of this approach is appealing. Judicial efforts to
define the force of law concept in the abstract both for legislative rule
characterization and for assessing Chevron’s scope have yielded
confusion and inconsistency. Most of the cases in which courts
evaluate whether rules are legislative or nonlegislative come down to
relatively minute degrees of practical binding effect, as evidenced by
the fact that contemporary standards for evaluating that question are
targeted at defining that illusive characteristic. At least anecdotally,
most agency rules seem to fall rather obviously into the legislative or
nonlegislative categories in a manner consistent with the presence or
absence of notice-and-comment rulemaking, making the question of
Chevron versus Skidmore fairly simple. While some members of the
Supreme Court are clearly comfortable with extending Chevron
deference to at least some nonlegislative rules, the Court has yet to
find an opportunity to apply Chevron to a rule promulgated using
procedures other than notice and comment.252 The short cut’s bright
250. Gersen, supra note 244, at 1720–21; Manning, supra note 249, at 938–40.
251. See, e.g., Mont. Sulphur & Chem. Co. v. EPA, 666 F.3d 1174, 1183 n.2 (9th Cir. 2012)
(“Agency actions which have gone through notice and comment are typically reviewed for
Chevron deference, but those which have not are still afforded Skidmore deference . . . .”); Sacora
v. Thomas, 628 F.3d 1059, 1066 (9th Cir. 2010) (“If the challenged policies had been adopted
pursuant to the notice-and-comment process, this would be the end of the inquiry.”).
252. Only two cases come close. The first is Edelman v. Lynchburg College, 535 U.S. 106
(2002), in which the Supreme Court considered a procedural regulation initially adopted by the
EEOC without notice and comment but subsequently reissued using those procedures. Id. at
122–24 (O’Connor, J., concurring). In an amicus brief, the EEOC claimed Chevron deference and
defended its lack of notice and comment by citing the APA’s procedural rule exception. See Brief
for the United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll., 533 U.S. 106 (2002) (No. 00-1072), 2001 WL
1002673 at *19 & n.11. After the Court’s majority declined to resolve the deference standard
question, Justice O’Connor in concurrence opined in favor of Chevron, but in so doing
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line would undoubtedly yield the same results as existing doctrine for
the vast majority of agency rules while conserving judicial resources.
Not everyone is convinced, however, due largely to continued
concerns of agency misuse and practical binding effect. The burdens of
notice and comment give agencies an incentive to avoid those
procedures as much as possible while still asserting their preferences.
As Robert Anthony documented, agencies frequently use
nonlegislative rules in a manner that gives them a high level of
practical binding effect, even while denying their legal force.253 The
D.C. Circuit describes the pattern of abusive agency behavior as
follows:
Congress passes a broadly worded statute. The agency follows with
regulations containing broad language, open-ended phrases,
ambiguous standards and the like. Then as years pass, the agency
issues circulars or guidance or memoranda, explaining, interpreting,
defining and often expanding the commands in the regulations. One
guidance document may yield another and then another and so on.
Several words in a regulation may spawn hundreds of pages of text as
the agency offers more and more detail regarding what its regulations
demand of regulated entities. Law is made, without notice and
comment, without public participation, and without publication in the
Federal Register or the Code of Federal Regulations. 254

Echoing these concerns, David Franklin observes that “[i]t would seem
inconsistent with both legislative intent and democratic theory to
allow agencies to make such decisions without public input whenever
they wish.”255
Indeed, then-Judge Kenneth Starr, in advocating the short cut,
conceded that “[a]gencies may yield to temptation and seek to shield
particularly emphasized the agency’s eventual use of notice and comment. See Edelman, 535
U.S. at 122–24 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Subsequently, in Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212
(2002), the Court extended Chevron deference to a regulation adopted by the Social Security
Administration using notice-and-comment rulemaking, but continued in dicta to suggest that
earlier, less formal documents advancing the same interpretation might also have warranted
Chevron deference notwithstanding their lack of notice and comment. 535 U.S. at 217–22.
253. See Anthony, supra note 205, at 1333–55 (summarizing numerous examples). Anthony
maintained that his examples were of policy statements, not interpretative rules, and suggested
that the two might carry different degrees of practical binding effect. Id. at 1355–59. Not all of
Anthony’s examples seem so obviously to be one rather than the other. As Ronald Levin observed
in response to Anthony’s suggestion, distinguishing between interpretative rules and policy
statements would be as difficult as distinguishing between legislative and nonlegislative rules,
and even less worth the effort. Ronald M. Levin, Nonlegislative Rules and the Administrative
Open Mind, 41 DUKE L.J. 1497, 1505–06 (1992).
254. Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F. 3d 1015, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 2000); see also Fund for
Animals, Inc. v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 460 F.3d 13, 23–26 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (Griffith, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (expressing the same concern).
255. Franklin, supra note 242, at 305.
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their regulations from the scrutiny occasioned by notice and comment
procedures, choosing instead to cast would-be regulations as
interpretative rules,” although he maintained “the danger is more
theoretical than real.”256 Donald Elliott likewise has recognized that
agencies might treat claimed policy statements as binding, though he
maintains that courts could still accommodate the short cut by
invalidating such actions for lack of contemporaneous justification.257
Jacob Gersen also accepts that concerns about agency abuse are “real,”
but contends that Mead should function to limit agencies’
inappropriate use of nonlegislative formats.258
Irrespective of the short cut’s merits, it does not quite resolve
the questions concerning temporary Treasury regulations and IRB
guidance in any event. The short cut’s applicability to temporary
Treasury regulations is especially superficial. The short cut was
promoted to eliminate the need to identify that illusive, heightened
degree of practical binding effect that tilts facially nonbinding
guidance into the legislative category. While temporary Treasury
regulations lack prepromulgation notice and comment, the
government does not claim that those documents are not legally
binding, but relies on other arguments to justify classifying its
regulations as interpretative and postponing notice and comment.259
By comparison, the short cut might seem particularly
appropriate for IRB guidance documents, which the government
routinely asserts lack at least the force of Treasury regulations. In
light of these assertions, and given their lack of notice and comment,
characterizing IRB guidance documents as nonlegislative and
reviewing them under the Skidmore standard as the short cut
suggests would seem quite reasonable. Although they do not reference
the administrative law literature advocating the short cut, most tax
scholars and commentators who label IRB guidance as nonlegislative
and advocate Skidmore review seem at least implicitly to adopt that
approach, as they point to various Treasury and IRS statements
disclaiming legal force for those documents in addition to the lack of

256. Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Starr, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
257. Elliott, supra note 244, at 1491.
258. See Gersen, supra note 244, at 1721 (“But for Mead, agencies might well make critical
interpretive choices using nonlegislative rules. But after Mead, this approach to policy is
implausible, or at least less attractive.”).
259. See supra Part I.C.1 (detailing government arguments defending the procedural
validity of temporary Treasury regulations).
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notice and comment.260 Yet these accounts do not address the penalty
elephant in the middle of the room: How should courts square
Treasury and IRS claims that IRB guidance lacks the force of law with
Treasury regulations that impose penalties for failing to comply with
interpretations contained in those formats? Can an interpretation
truly be said to lack legal force if it carries penalty potential? By
contrast, while they do not say so explicitly, administrative law
scholars discussing the relative merits and demerits of the short cut
seem to assume that the interpretations at issue do not carry the
facial legal effect that penalties represent.
Regardless, courts have declined to adopt the short cut either
for distinguishing between legislative and nonlegislative rules or for
applying the Chevron standard.261 Courts continue to invalidate
alleged interpretative rules and policy statements on the ground that
they are legislative rules that need to go through notice and comment.
After expressly refusing to require notice and comment as a condition
of Chevron deference in Mead,262 the Supreme Court has continued to
maintain that such procedures alone are neither necessary nor
sufficient to justify Chevron review. In Barnhart v. Walton, while
deferring under Chevron to a notice-and-comment regulation, the
Court observed that “the fact that the Agency previously reached its
interpretation through means less formal than ‘notice and comment’
rulemaking does not automatically deprive that interpretation of”
Chevron deference.263 In Edelman v. Lynchburg College, without
deciding whether an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
regulation interpreting Title VII was eligible for Chevron deference
under Mead, the Court noted that Chevron deference “does not
necessarily require an agency’s exercise of express notice-andcomment rulemaking power.”264
B. Exploring the Delegation Premise
In lieu of the short cut, the Supreme Court has embraced
congressional delegation and agency exercise of delegated power as
driving the force of law inquiry for both legislative rule
260. See, e.g., Salem et al., supra note 132, at 744–45 (discussing Treasury and IRS
characterizations of IRB guidance and recommending Skidmore review for those formats).
261. See Franklin, supra note 244, at 294–303 (summarizing key cases).
262. See 533 U.S. 218, 231 (2001) (“[A]s significant as notice-and-comment is in pointing to
Chevron authority, the want of that procedure here does not decide the case.”).
263. 535 U.S. 212, 222–23 (2002).
264. 535 U.S. 106, 114 (2002).
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characterization and Chevron deference. Although the Supreme Court
has never had very much to say about the distinction between
legislative rules and nonlegislative ones, the Court has consistently
described the capacity of administrative agencies to promulgate
legislative rules as a function of congressional delegation. In
describing legislative rules as “affecting individual rights and
obligations” and having “the force of law,” the Supreme Court in
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown elaborated that “the exercise of quasilegislative authority by governmental departments and agencies must
be rooted in a grant of such power by the Congress and subject to
limitations which that body imposes.”265 In addressing a related
question of an agency’s power to adopt retroactively effective rules in
Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital, the Court said, “It is
axiomatic that an administrative agency’s power to promulgate
legislative regulations is limited to the authority delegated by
Congress.”266 In Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, the Court
listed the agency’s use of notice-and-comment rulemaking as a reason
for characterizing a regulation as legislative, but principally as an
indicator that the agency intended the regulation to be “a binding
exercise of its rulemaking authority” as delegated by Congress.267
The D.C. Circuit has likewise linked the characterization of
legislative rules with the exercise of delegated power. As already
noted, in the American Mining Congress case, the court expressly
linked the determination that a rule is legislative with the existence
and exercise of congressionally delegated power.268 American Mining
Congress was not an outlier in this regard. Other D.C. Circuit
decisions express similar sentiments. For example, in National Latino
Media Coalition v. Federal Communications Commission, the D.C.
Circuit recognized that “[w]hen Congress delegates rulemaking
authority to an agency, and the agency adopts legislative rules, the
agency stands in the place of Congress and makes law.”269 And in
American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Service, the
D.C. Circuit said that “[a] rule can be legislative only if Congress
delegated legislative power to the agency and if the agency intended to

265. 441 U.S. 281, 302 (1979) (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 232 (1974)).
266. 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988).
267. 551 U.S. 158, 172 (2007).
268. 995 F.2d 1106, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see also supra notes 75–84 and accompanying text
(discussing the American Mining Congress test for distinguishing between legislative and
nonlegislative rules).
269. 816 F.2d 785, 788 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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use that power in promulgating the rule at issue.”270 Other federal
circuit courts have followed the D.C. Circuit’s lead, embracing the
relationship between the force of law and congressional delegation in
distinguishing legislative rules from nonlegislative ones.271 As the
Third Circuit observed in Elizabeth Blackwell Health Center for
Women v. Knoll, for example:
American Mining is nothing more than a refinement of the law . . . ;
that is to say, for a rule to be legislative and have the force of law,
Congress must have delegated legislative power to the agency and the
agency must have intended to exercise that power in promulgating its
rule.272

Regarding deference, the Chevron Court spoke in terms of
congressional delegations of power in describing the types of agency
interpretations eligible for the strong, mandatory deference advocated
in that case.273 The Court recognized that Congress sometimes
“explicitly [leaves] a gap for the agency to fill,” creating “an express
delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision
of the statute by regulation.”274 The Court also maintained that
“[s]ometimes the legislative delegation to any agency on a particular
question is implicit, rather than explicit,” but cautioned reviewing
courts in such instances not to “substitute [their] own construction of a
statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the
administrator of an agency.”275
In articulating its own two-part test, the Court in Mead
likewise predicated the availability of Chevron deference on the
presence and the exercise of congressionally delegated power.
According to Mead, Chevron only applies “when it appears that
Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules
carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming
deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”276 As
with Chevron, the Mead Court recognized that both express and
implied statutory delegations of power to elucidate statutory
270. 707 F.2d 548, 558 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
271. See, e.g., Erringer v. Thompson, 371 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Legislative rules . . .
create rights, impose obligations, or effect a change in existing law pursuant to authority
delegated by Congress.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Hoctor v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 82
F.3d 165, 169 (1996) (describing the promulgation of a legislative rule as a “legislative task
entrusted to the agency” by Congress).
272. 61 F.3d 170, 187 (3d Cir. 1995).
273. 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984).
274. Id. at 843–44.
275. Id. at 844.
276. 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001).
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provisions and fill statutory gaps indicate “that Congress would expect
the agency to be able to speak with the force of law.”277 In the presence
of such an expectation, “a reviewing court has no business rejecting an
agency’s exercise of its generally conferred authority to resolve a
particular statutory ambiguity simply because the agency’s chosen
resolution seems unwise.”278 An agency’s use of notice-and-comment
rulemaking procedures was relevant only as “a very good indicator of
delegation meriting Chevron treatment.”279
The Court has spoken of Chevron’s delegation premise in
subsequent cases as well. In National Cable & Telecommunications
Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services, the Court described “ambiguities in
statutes within an agency’s jurisdiction” as “delegations of authority to
the agency to fill the statutory gap in reasonable fashion.”280 Looking
at the language of the statute, the Court went on to defer to the
Federal Communications Commission’s interpretation of the
Communications Act because “Congress has delegated to the
Commission the authority to ‘execute and enforce’ the
Communications Act . . . and to ‘prescribe such rules and regulations
as may be necessary in the public interest to carry out the provisions’
of the Act.”281 Most recently, in United States v. Home Concrete &
Supply, LLC, writing for a four-Justice plurality, Justice Breyer took
the position that not every ambiguity in a statute represents a
congressional delegation of gap-filling power.282 Meanwhile, Justice
Kennedy in dissent, also writing for four Justices, described statutory
amendments as “Congress [giving] new instruction” to an
administering agency and the majority’s Chevron step one resolution
as “constricting Congress’s ability to leave agencies in charge of filling
statutory gaps.”283 Neither of these opinions even mentioned notice
and comment procedures.
The Court’s emphasis on delegation as primary, with notice
and comment as only a secondary indicator, is hardly surprising. The
modern administrative state reflects an implicit compromise of
allowing Congress to delegate expansive lawmaking power to agencies
277. Id. at 229.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005).
281. Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C. §§ 151 & 201(b)).
282. 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1844 (2012) (“There is no reason to believe that the linguistic
ambiguity noted by [Colony, Inc. v. Comm’r, 354 U.S. 28 (1958)] reflects a post-Chevron
conclusion that Congress had delegated gap-filling power to the agency.”).
283. Id. at 1852.
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in exchange for imposing substantial procedural requirements as
agencies exercise those powers, with courts serving as the enforcer
thereof. While courts continue formally to recognize the doctrine that
Congress may not constitutionally delegate the legislative power
conferred upon it by the Constitution,284 as a practical matter the
nondelegation doctrine has been inoperative for several decades.285
Contemporary administrative law doctrine revolves around the
rebalancing of governmental power in light of extensive congressional
delegations of legislative power to administrative agencies.286
Scholars and courts generally offer two reasons for accepting
congressional delegations of lawmaking powers to agencies. First,
Congress simply must delegate power if it is to accomplish all that the
American people expect from their government.287 Second, applying
the nondelegation doctrine requires distinguishing between legislating
and executing the law, but the line between legislation and execution
is blurry, and meaningful distinctions are elusive.288
A likely third reason the Court has so willingly avoided
challenging Congress over delegations, while preserving the option to
do so, is that Congress has provided an acceptable alternative in the
284. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (overturning
the Court of Appeals’s holding that the EPA violated the nondelegation doctrine).
285. The Supreme Court has not rejected a statute on nondelegation grounds since 1935. See
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 542 (1935) (declaring Section 3 of
the National Industrial Recovery Act “an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power”); Pan.
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 431 (1935) (rejecting Section 9(c) of the National Industrial
Recovery Act as unconstitutional on nondelegation grounds). Indeed, much more recently, the
Court declared itself unqualified “to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of
policy judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the law.” American Trucking
Ass’ns, 531 U.S. at 474–75 (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989)); see also
1 PIERCE, supra note 26, § 2.6 (“The Court has become increasingly candid in recognizing its
inability to enforce any meaningful limitation on Congress’ power to delegate its legislative
power to an appropriate institution.”); Kenneth Culp Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U.
CHI. L. REV. 713, 713 (1969) (“The non-delegation doctrine is almost a complete failure. It has not
prevented the delegation of legislative power.”).
286. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 285, at 713 (recognizing the nondelegation doctrine’s failure
and suggesting that “[t]he focus of judicial inquiries thus should shift from statutory standards
to administrative safeguards and administrative standards”).
287. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372 (“[O]ur jurisprudence has been driven by a practical
understanding that in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more
technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under
broad general directives.”).
288. See id. at 415 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (recognizing the difficulty of enforcing the
nondelegation doctrine because “[o]nce it is conceded, as it must be, that no statute can be
entirely precise, and that some judgments, even some judgments involving policy considerations,
must be left to the officers executing the law and to the judges applying it, the debate over
unconstitutional delegation becomes a debate not over a point of principle but over a question of
degree”).
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form of APA notice and comment procedures. As agencies have
expanded their use of statutory authority to promulgate legally
binding rules, courts have interpreted the APA’s requirements more
expansively to facilitate meaningful public participation and
transparency in rulemaking and to enhance their own ability to police
against agency arbitrariness.289 Particularly as interpreted by courts,
the APA’s procedural requirements for agency rulemaking mimic key
aspects of the legislative process.290 Much like the legislative process,
the APA’s notice and comment requirements provide the agency with
“the facts and information relevant to a particular administrative
problem, as well as suggestions for alternative solutions,”291 and
“reintroduce public participation and fairness to affected parties after
governmental authority has been delegated to unrepresentative
agencies.”292
Another key feature of the APA is its designation of the courts
as a meaningful check against agency exercises of rulemaking power.
Since the Court’s decision in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner in 1967,
courts have interpreted the APA as establishing a presumption in
favor of pre-enforcement judicial review of agency rulemaking
efforts.293 Thus, regulated parties ordinarily may challenge the
validity of legally binding agency rules in court as soon as the agency
finalizes them, before the rules become too entrenched. In other
words, regulated parties are not left with a choice between incurring
the costs to organize their primary behavior to conform with arguably

289. See Mathew McCubbins, Roger Noll & Barry Weingast, Administrative Procedures as
Instruments of Political Control, 3 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 244 (1987) (making a similar
observation regarding the relationship between procedure and political control of regulatory
agencies, and noting that administrative procedures provide information necessary for policing
agency action and allow interested parties to participate in agency decisionmaking); cf.
Christopher Edley, Jr., The Governance Crisis, Legal Theory, and Political Ideology, 1991 DUKE
L.J. 561, 566 (describing contemporary U.S. administrative law as an exercise in
“antidiscretion,” with judges employing doctrine to curtail agency discretion through
congressionally enacted procedural safeguards and judicial review).
290. See Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Pena, 44 F.3d 437, 441–42 (7th Cir. 1994)
(comparing APA rulemaking requirements with the legislative process). Indeed, McCubbins,
Noll, and Weingast have argued that some members of Congress supported the APA’s enactment
as a means of slowing down the rulemaking process through procedure. See McCubbins, Noll &
Weingast, supra note 289, at 255–59.
291. American Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1044 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (quoting
Guardian Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 589 F.2d 658, 662 (D.C. Cir.
1978)).
292. Id. (quoting Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
293. 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967).
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invalid rules or suffering the uncertainty and potential penalties of
noncompliance.294
Nevertheless, while asserting its authority both to police
agency behavior and to interpret the law, the Court has recognized
that some agency actions are less about legal interpretation and more
about choosing between competing policy alternatives, both of which
are compatible with statutory language. Indeed, as with the Court’s
nondelegation jurisprudence, Chevron recognizes that the line
between lawmaking and statutory interpretation is a difficult one to
draw, and that much of what we label as statutory interpretation is
really about policy choice. Where Congress’s meaning is clear,295 an
agency’s actions cannot be anything more than an exercise of
congressional intent. But where a statute is ambiguous, and an agency
is exercising congressionally delegated power to act with the force of
law, Chevron instructs reviewing courts to defer to the agency’s
substantive interpretations of legal meaning so long as those
interpretations remain within the boundaries of delegated
authority.296
The Chevron doctrine is designed to remove the courts from the
substantive act of agency lawmaking so long as the agency stays
within legislatively defined parameters. As the Court made clear in
Mead, however, Chevron only applies where Congress has granted an
agency the power to act with the force of law, and where the agency
has exercised that power. In other words, the Court has predicated
eligibility for Chevron on the agency’s acting in the role of Congress’s
delegee.
In sum, agencies act with the force of law when they exercise
congressionally delegated power. To the extent the Court’s
acquiescence to congressional delegations derives from the
corresponding guarantees of transparency and accountability offered
by the APA, it makes sense that the Court would closely associate

294. See id. at 152–53 (“If petitioners wish to comply they must . . . invest heavily in new
printing type and new supplies. The alternative to compliance—continued use of material which
they believe in good faith meets the statutory requirements, but which clearly does not meet the
regulation of the Commissioner—may be even more costly. That course would risk serious
criminal and civil penalties for the unlawful distribution of ‘misbranded’ drugs.”).
295. Of course, how clear is “clear” is a classic Chevron question that courts and scholars
have never been able to resolve with any accuracy. See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to
Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 520–21 (“How clear is clear? It is
here, if Chevron is not abandoned, that the future battles over acceptance of agency
interpretations of law will be fought.”).
296. 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
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both the legislative rule category and Chevron deference with noticeand-comment rulemaking.
Congress has at times authorized legally binding regulations
through procedures other than the APA’s notice and comment
requirements. APA notice-and-comment rulemaking reflects a
congressional assessment regarding the proper balance in most cases
between agency flexibility on the one hand and transparency and
accountability on the other. Occasionally, Congress calibrates that
balance differently. Sometimes, Congress does this in individual
statutes. For example, in the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act,
Congress instructed the FAA to “publish in the Federal Register an
initial fee schedule and associated collection process as an interimfinal rule, pursuant to which public comment will be sought and a
final rule issued.”297 In Asiana Airlines v. FAA, the D.C. Circuit held
that, with this language, Congress authorized the FAA to utilize
procedures somewhat different than those outlined in the APA in
adopting legally binding regulations.298 More generally, in the APA
itself, Congress provided the good cause exception whereby agencies
can adopt legislative rules without notice and comment given the right
circumstances.299 If Congress has authorized alternative procedures
for binding regulated parties with the force of law, then it makes little
sense to deny the resulting rules legal force and thus Chevron
deference because the agency did not follow the APA’s notice and
comment procedures.
Commentary regarding Mead has been particularly critical of
the Supreme Court’s delegation premise. Reflecting perhaps the most
common criticism, in an article with David Barron, now-Justice Elena
Kagan described Mead’s emphasis on delegation and its resulting
inquiry into congressional intent “chimerical” and “fraudulent,” as
Congress “rarely discloses (or, perhaps, even has) a view” regarding
whether Chevron ought to apply instead of Skidmore.300 Mead’s critics
are absolutely correct that “[f]ederal statutes almost never speak
directly to the standard of review of an agency’s interpretations.”301
Nevertheless, Congress often attends carefully to the details in
establishing which agency it charges with administering particular
297. 49 U.S.C. § 45301(b)(2) (2006).
298. 134 F.3d 393, 398 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
299. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) (2006); see also supra notes 150–61 and accompanying text
(discussing the good cause exception).
300. David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV.
201, 203.
301. Id. at 216.
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statutes, and the organizational elements of new agencies that it
establishes for such purposes. For example, Congress has authorized
the EEOC only to issue “procedural regulations” under the Civil
Rights Act,302 even while giving the same agency substantive
rulemaking power under the Americans with Disabilities Act.303 As
highlighted in Skidmore, Congress designated the courts rather than
the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor as the
primary interpreter of the Fair Labor Standards Act.304 In some
instances, Congress has divided rulemaking and administrative
adjudication tasks between different agencies,305 while in other cases
it has combined both powers in the same agency.306 Courts are entirely
reasonable to infer from such statutory markers that Congress
intended to give agencies a special gap-filling role in some statutes but
not in others.307 Recent empirical research by Lisa Bressman and
Abbe Gluck suggests further that at least today’s Congress is both
aware of Chevron308 and, in drafting legislation, thinks of delegation in
terms consistent with Mead’s assumptions.309

302. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (2006) (“The Commission shall have the authority from
time to time to issue, amend, or rescind suitable procedural regulations to carry out the
provisions of this subchapter.”)
303. See id. § 12116 (authorizing the EEOC to adopt substantive regulations governing
private sector discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act).
304. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 137 (1944) (“Congress did not utilize the
services of an administrative agency to find facts and to determine in the first instance whether
particular cases fall within or without the Act. Instead, it put this responsibility on the courts.”).
305. See, e.g., Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. O’Keefe, 545 F.2d 337, 342–43 (3d
Cir. 1976) (detailing the administrative scheme of the Longshore and Harbor Workers’
Compensation Act, which divides responsibilities in this way); George Robert Johnson, Jr., The
Split-Enforcement Model: Some Conclusions from the OSHA and MSHA Experiences, 39 ADMIN.
L. REV. 315, 317–23 (1987) (detailing the history of the Occupational Safety and Health Act and
the Mine Safety and Health Act, both of which adopted this model).
306. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co. Div. of Textron, Inc., 416 U.S. 267, 290–95 (1974)
(recognizing the authority of the NLRB to engage in both rulemaking and adjudication at its
discretion).
307. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Reclaiming the Legal Fiction of Congressional Delegation,
97 VA. L. REV. 2009, 2012 (2011) (describing the fiction of congressional delegation as “a fiction
only in the sense that the Court is not searching for actual legislative intent but is imputing
legislative intent”).
308. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—
An Empirical Study of Legislative Drafting, Delegation and the Canons, 65 STAN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2013) (on file with author) (documenting that 82.48 percent of congressional
counsels surveyed are aware of the Chevron standard).
309. Id.; see also Bressman, supra note 307, at 2011 (recognizing additional empirical
support that “the basic presumption of congressional delegation is well grounded” and “an
express delegation of regulatory authority generally carries an implied delegation of interpretive
authority”).
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C. Penalties as a Key Indicator of Delegation
So how should the courts discern that Congress has delegated
the power to act with the force of law through rulemaking? As
discussed above, for the most part, the courts’ emphasis has been on
statutory language generally authorizing agency rules and
regulations, as for example with I.R.C. § 7805(a).310 Yet, Congress
grants rulemaking authority in statutes using a variety of rhetorical
formulations, not all of which have been deemed by the courts as
delegations of legislative power.311 The Court in Mead recognized that
the relevant statute gave the Customs Service the power to act with
the force of law, but found little indication in the statute’s language or
history that Congress intended to recognize classification ruling
letters as an exercise of that delegation.312
Shortly after the Court decided the Mead case, Thomas Merrill
suggested the presence or absence of congressionally imposed
sanctions or other adverse consequences for the violation of agency
rules as a key variable in ascertaining whether Congress intended to
delegate the power to act with the force of law. “Focusing on the
presence or absence of congressionally-prescribed legal consequences
is more than just a convenient formalism. It also makes sense as a
guide to congressional intent.”313 Subsequently, Merrill and Kathryn
Watts documented exhaustively that, at least in the context of agency
rulemaking, Congress historically signaled its intent to delegate
legislative power through provisions imposing penalties or similar
consequences for noncompliance with agency commands.314 If
Congress specified in the statute that a violation of agency rules would
subject the offending party to some sanction—for example, a civil or
criminal penalty; loss of a permit, license, or benefits; or other adverse
legal consequences—then the grant conferred power to make rules
with the force of law. Conversely, if Congress made no provision for
sanctions for rule violations, the grant authorized only procedural or
interpretive rules.315

310. See supra notes 108–115 and accompanying text (summarizing Supreme Court cases
recognizing statutes as delegating authority to act with the force of law).
311. See, e.g., supra notes 116–119 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court’s
narrow construction of a general rulemaking grant in the Controlled Substances Act).
312. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 231–32 (2001).
313. Merrill, supra note 63, at 827–30.
314. Merrill & Watts, supra note 49, at 472.
315. Id.

2b. Hickman_PAGE (Do Not Delete)

2013]

UNPACKING THE FORCE OF LAW

3/25/2013 3:45 PM

525

The presence or absence of statutory penalties for
noncompliance is clearly not the sine qua non for concluding that
agency pronouncements carry or lack the force of law. Merrill and
Watts acknowledge that contemporary courts have not always acted
consistently with this approach, leaving the presence of penalty
provisions at best a significant indicator of congressional delegation.316
Certainly, at the margins, courts have occasionally recognized the
legal force of agency rules issued under rulemaking grants that lack
corresponding statutory sanctions. Einer Elhauge notes further that
Mead itself denied Chevron deference to individualized tariff letter
rulings with which the recipients were required to comply if they
wanted to bring their goods into the United States, and that this sort
of state sanction for noncompliance with agency adjudications is at
least analogous to statutory penalties for noncompliance with agency
rules.317 While Elhauge is absolutely correct, the phenomenon he
observes appears to be limited to informal adjudications like that in
Mead that are beyond the scope of this Article.
In other words, courts may sometimes conclude that an agency
rule that lacks statutory sanctions nevertheless carries the force of
law, or that an informal adjudication with a limited coercive range
does not carry legal force. But just as courts’ application of the
legislative rule category has been an exercise in expanding beyond
legal effect to some degree of practical binding effect, and just as the
boundaries of Chevron’s domain include but are not limited to agency
rules promulgated using APA notice-and-comment rulemaking, so it
seems the coupling of rulemaking power with statutory penalties
represents the paradigmatic example of a congressional delegation of
power to act with the force of law. Correspondingly, the agency’s
choice to advance its legal interpretations through formats directly
associated with congressionally imposed penalties would seem to
constitute an exercise of congressionally delegated power to act with
the force of law.

316. See id. at 473–74 (acknowledging instances of pre-Chevron courts failing to evaluate
force of law by reference to sanctions). Merrill and Watts highlight two cases in particular:
National Petroleum Refiners Ass’n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), and National Ass’n of
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers v. FDA, 637 F.2d 877 (2d Cir. 1981). Id.; see also id. at 549–65
(discussing the circumstances of these two cases at length). Merrill and Watts also recognize
Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 386 U.S. 670 (1967), as another such case. Id. at 529.
317. See EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES 92–94 (2008) (discussing the
relationship between Chevron deference and statutory penalties).
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D. Delegation, Penalties, and Tax Administration
In pursuing their thesis, Merrill and Watts present the
Internal Revenue Code as an exception, concluding from legislative
history that Congress did not intend its inclusion of both general
rulemaking authority and corresponding penalties in the early income
tax statutes to convey the power to act with the force of law.318 I have
argued elsewhere that Merrill and Watts misconstrue the early tax
penalty provisions, and I will not revisit that argument here.319
Whatever the original understanding, more recent events and the
Supreme Court’s decision in Mayo dictate a different conclusion today.
Penalties for underpayment of taxes due to negligence or
intentional disregard of tax “rules and regulations” have been part of
the tax laws since 1918 and 1921, respectively.320 The statute failed to
define the scope of those penalties, however, and the legislative
history of these penalty provisions offered few insights regarding
Congress’s intent. As a result, for decades after their enactment,
courts declined to apply them so long as taxpayers could articulate a
reasonable argument for the inapplicability or invalidity of a tax rule
or regulation.321 As part of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Congress
adopted new penalties for tax return preparers found guilty of
“negligent or intentional disregard of rules and regulations.”322 Again,
however, Congress at that time failed to define what it meant by
either “negligence or intentional disregard” or “rules and regulations,”
although the legislative history stated that “good faith dispute[s]” over
IRS interpretations of the law were not sanctionable and that the new
tax preparer penalty and existing penalties for taxpayer disregard of

318. See Merrill & Watts, supra note 49, at 571–72 (discussing the Revenue Act of 1917 and
its history).
319. See Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial
Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1603–04 & n.336 (2006) (critiquing Merrill and Watts’s
interpretation of the early tax penalty provisions).
320. See Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 254, § 250(b), 40 Stat. 1057, 1083 (1919) (adopting
the negligence penalty); Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-98, § 250(b), 42 Stat. 227, 264–65
(adding language regarding intentional disregard of rules and regulations).
321. See, e.g., Michael Asimow, Civil Penalties for Inaccurate and Delinquent Tax Returns,
23 UCLA L. REV. 637, 659 (1976) (recounting the early treatment of the intentional disregard
penalty); Arnold Hoffman, Intentional Disregard of Rules and Regulations, 28 TAXES 111, 111–13
(1950) (describing the history and application of the intentional disregard penalty); Donald
Arthur Winslow, Tax Penalties—“They Shoot Dogs, Don’t They?”, 43 FLA. L. REV. 811, 836–43
(1991) (describing the history and application of the negligence penalty).
322. Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1203, 90 Stat. 1520, 1689 (1976) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 6694
(2006)).
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tax rules and regulations should be read similarly.323 Congress has
never defined precisely what it means in these penalty provisions by
“rules and regulations.” Congress defined the terms “negligence” and
“disregard” in the Tax Reform Act of 1986, but in doing so mentioned
only compliance “with the provisions of this title,” and not temporary
regulations or IRB guidance.324
Nevertheless, as noted above, in 1991, Treasury adopted Treas.
Reg. §§ 1.6662-3 and 1.6694-3, in which it expressly defined rules and
regulations for purposes of these penalty provisions as including
temporary regulations, revenue rulings, and IRS notices, while
suggesting in the regulatory preamble that the same would be true of
at least some revenue procedures.325 After comments to the proposed
definition objected particularly to the inclusion of revenue rulings on
the ground that those documents lacked public notice and comment,
Treasury contended that the 1976 legislative history “expressly
provides that rules and regulations include regulations and ‘IRS
rulings.’ ”326 But in discussing the new tax preparer penalty, the 1976
legislative history mostly refers to rules and regulations without
elaboration, consistent with the statutory language. In a few
instances, the history instead substitutes the term “rulings” for
“rules,” and in one instance the history speaks of “IRS regulations and
rulings.”327 That legislative history does not specifically mention
revenue rulings or revenue procedures by name, even though the IRS
had been issuing those documents since the 1950s. And of course that
legislative history is silent regarding temporary regulations and
notices, which did not emerge as standard formats until the 1980s.328
323. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-658, at 278 (1975), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2897, 3174; S.
REP. NO. 94-938, pt. 1, at 355–56 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3439, 3784–85.
324. I.R.C. § 6662(c) (2006) (“[T]he term ‘negligence’ includes any failure to make a
reasonable attempt to comply with the provisions of this title, and the term ‘disregard’ includes
any careless, reckless, or intentional disregard.”); see also Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-514, § 1503, 100 Stat. 2085, 2742; H.R. REP. NO. 99-841, at 4867–80 (1986) (Conf. Rep.),
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2897, 779–82 (discussing the addition of the definitional
language).
325. Accuracy-related Penalty, T.D. 8381, 56 Fed. Reg. 67,492-01, 67,494 (Dec. 31, 1991);
Penalty on Income Tax Return Preparers Who Understate Taxpayer’s Liability on a Federal
Income Tax Return or a Claim for Refund, T.D. 8382, 56 Fed. Reg. 67,509-1, 67,513 (Dec. 31,
1991).
326. Accuracy-related Penalty, T.D. 8381, 56 Fed. Reg. at 67,494; Penalty on Income Tax
Return Preparers Who Understate Taxpayer’s Liability on a Federal Income Tax Return or a
Claim for Refund, T.D. 8382, 56 Fed. Reg. at 67,513.
327. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-658, supra note 323, at 278; S. REP. NO. 94-938, supra note 323,
at 355–56.
328. See Hickman, supra note 15, at 1797 (documenting the history of the Treasury’s use of
temporary regulations); Hickman, supra note 17, at 250 (“The first notice so-labeled seems to
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Notwithstanding that the legislative history provides at best a
weak foundation for extending the penalty provisions to temporary
regulations or IRB guidance, the fact remains that Congress has not
itself clarified the scope of these penalty provisions by defining rules
and regulations. Meanwhile, Congress has clearly authorized
Treasury to adopt regulations resolving ambiguities in the I.R.C.
Exercising that congressionally delegated power, Treasury has
adopted binding regulations proclaiming, based on legislative history,
that statutory penalties apply to taxpayers and tax preparers who fail
to comply with the interpretations contained in temporary regulations
and IRB guidance documents. In so doing, Treasury has staked its
position that Congress delegated to it the power to bind regulated
parties with the force of law using temporary regulations and IRB
guidance documents. In using those formats to communicate
interpretations of the I.R.C., therefore, Treasury and the IRS signal
their intent to exercise that delegated power.
Admittedly, the standards for assessing penalties for failing to
follow temporary regulations and IRB guidance are different from one
another. For example, taxpayers who adopt return positions
inconsistent with Treasury regulations—whether final or temporary—
must both disclose their noncompliance on their tax returns and have
a “reasonable basis” for the position taken to avoid the twenty percent
underpayment penalty imposed by I.R.C. § 6662(b)(1).329 Furthermore,
to avoid that penalty, a taxpayer’s decision not to comply with a
Treasury regulation must represent “a good faith challenge to the
validity of the regulation.”330 By comparison, a taxpayer who declines
or otherwise fails to follow IRB guidance is exempt from the twenty
percent underpayment penalty if the taxpayer’s position “has a
realistic possibility of being sustained on its merits,” whether or not
the taxpayer discloses the noncompliance or intends to challenge the
rule’s validity.331 In concluding that revenue rulings lack the force of
law for purposes of Mead and Chevron, the Fifth Circuit in Kornman
have been published in the IRB in 1976. . . . The notice format became more regularized in the
1980s . . . .”).
329. Disclosure is not required to avoid a penalty for negligence alone, as “[a] return position
that has a reasonable basis . . . is not attributable to negligence.” Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(1)
(2012). Yet reasonable basis alone is inadequate to avoid a penalty for “intentional disregard,” as
the regulations define that phrase. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(2).
330. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(c)(1).
331. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(a), (b)(2). This standard does not apply to taxpayers who take
positions contrary to IRB guidance with respect to a reportable transaction. Id.; see also supra
notes 215–218 and 223 and accompanying text (discussing the role of revenue procedures and
notices in identifying reportable transactions and the penalties associated therewith).
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and Associates, Inc. v. United States made special note of the more
lenient penalty standard associated with those documents.332
If the goal is to determine which agency actions carry the force
of law, then distinguishing between temporary Treasury regulations
and IRB guidance based on the relative severity or leniency of
Treasury’s penalty standards, as the Kornman court did, draws the
line in the wrong place. Under either standard, the government seeks
to impose penalties for noncompliance on at least some taxpayers who
fail to comply with interpretations advanced in the listed formats. If
one associates congressionally imposed penalty provisions (and agency
interpretations thereof) with the delegation of authority to act with
the force of law, then the relevant line ought instead to be between
formats that carry penalties and those that do not.
III. CONFRONTING THE IMPLICATIONS FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION
The foregoing analysis leads me to conclude that temporary
Treasury regulations and IRB guidance documents carry the force and
effect of law, are legislative rules necessitating APA notice and
comment (and are invalid to the extent that they lack those
procedures), and under Mead fall within Chevron’s domain. By this
statement, I do not mean to suggest that existing legal doctrines
concerning the characterization of agency rules or the applicability of
Chevron review are crystal clear; they certainly are not. If, however,
courts continue to take the Supreme Court’s delegation rhetoric
seriously, then I think these conclusions flow logically from Mayo’s
characterization of I.R.C. § 7805(a) as a delegation to Treasury to act
with the force of law and from Treasury’s decision to invest the
temporary regulation and IRB guidance formats with penalty
potential.
Whatever the doctrinal validity of these conclusions, their
practical implications for the systemic integrity of the tax system are
challenging. Many if not most administrative law cases concerning the
procedural validity of agency rules arise pre-enforcement, before
regulated parties have much opportunity to organize their primary
behavior in compliance.333 The standard remedy for agency rules with
332. Kornman & Assoc., Inc. v. United States, 527 F.3d 443, 454 (5th Cir. 2008).
333. See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967) (reading the APA as adopting a
presumption in favor of pre-enforcement judicial review of agency regulations); 2 PIERCE, supra
note 26, § 15.14 (“After Abbott, pre-enforcement review of rules became the norm in the large
class of cases in which the challenge to the rule’s validity raised one or more issues that were
susceptible to judicial resolution before the rule was applied.”).
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procedural errors is remand to the agency.334 On occasion, a court will
remand with instructions to comply with the APA but will allow the
rule in question to remain in effect in the interim.335 More typically,
however, the reviewing court will invalidate the rule outright and
leave the agency to decide how it wishes to proceed.336
Judicial review in tax cases follows a different norm from that
in other areas of administrative law. For a variety of reasons, most
prominently the Anti-Injunction Act provision of I.R.C. § 7421(a), preenforcement judicial review of APA procedural challenges is a
rarity.337 Instead, taxpayer-initiated tax litigation only occurs after
the taxpayer has requested and been denied a refund of taxes already
paid or the IRS has examined the taxpayer’s tax filings and concluded
that taxes or penalties are due.338 In either of these circumstances, the
case comes to court only after the IRS has applied its rules and
regulations to reach a conclusion about a particular taxpayer’s
obligations, which may be years after the initial publication of those
rules and regulations.
As noted, Treasury’s routine issuance of temporary regulations
raises APA procedural questions not only for the temporary
regulations themselves but also for final regulations that eventually

334. See 3 KOCH, supra note 152, § 8:31[2](a) (recognizing prominence of remand as a
remedy in administrative law cases, “including such orders as remand for further proceedings,
remand with instruction, and reversal and remand”).
335. See, e.g., Checkosky v. SEC, 23 F.3d 452, 466 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (listing D.C. Circuit cases
remanding without vacating agency actions); W. Oil & Gas Ass’n v. EPA, 633 F.2d 803, 813 (9th
Cir. 1980) (concluding that the agency failed adequately to comply with APA notice and comment
requirements but leaving regulation in effect pending completion of those procedures); see also
Daniel B. Rodriguez, Of Gift Horses and Great Expectations: Remands Without Vacatur in
Administrative Law, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 599, 624–35 (2004) (criticizing remand without vacating as
a remedy); Ronald M. Levin, “Vacation” At Sea: Judicial Remands and the APA, ADMIN. & REG.
L. NEWS, Spring 1996, at 4 (discussing remand without vacating as a remedy).
336. See 3 PIERCE, supra note 26, § 18.1 (“In most cases, successful prosecution of a review
proceeding yields instead a judicial decision setting aside the agency action and remanding the
proceeding for further agency action not inconsistent with the decision of the reviewing court.”).
337. I.R.C. § 7421(a) provides generally that “no suit for the purpose of restraining the
assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person, whether or
not such person is the person against whom such tax was assessed.” I.R.C. § 7421(a) (2006).
Although the jurisprudence is not conclusive, this provision is generally thought to preclude preenforcement review of most tax cases, including those that raise APA procedural challenges. See
also Kristin E. Hickman, A Problem of Remedy: Responding to Treasury’s (Lack of) Compliance
with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1153,
1165–81 (2008) (discussing doctrinal limitations on pre-enforcement judicial review in the tax
context, including but not limited to I.R.C. § 7421(a)).
338. See GERALD A. KAFKA & RITA A. CAVANAGH, LITIGATION OF FEDERAL CIVIL TAX
CONTROVERSIES § 1.01 (2d ed. 1997) (dividing tax litigation generally into the refund and
deficiency categories).
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replace them. Given the timing of judicial review in tax cases,
adopting a categorical rule rejecting as procedurally invalid all
Treasury regulations with temporary origins in addition to existing
temporary Treasury regulations could be destabilizing. While
Treasury has never finalized many of the temporary regulations that
it issued in the 1980s and early 1990s, many more Treasury
regulations that were initially promulgated in temporary form have
since been finalized through postpromulgation notice and comment.
Often, though not always, Treasury has made changes to its
temporary regulations in response to comments received. Taxpayers
have relied upon these regulations in organizing their affairs.
Categorically invalidating and remanding Treasury regulations with
temporary origins would upset taxpayers’ settled expectations and
could seem more arbitrary and capricious than leaving the regulations
in place notwithstanding their procedural flaws. Other areas of law
might suffer similarly from a categorical rejection of Treasury’s use of
temporary regulations, as many other agencies employ interim-final
rulemaking with postpromulgation notice and comment, and
presumably at least some of those efforts rest upon flawed assertions
of one or another exception from APA § 553.339
The procedural shortcomings of IRB guidance documents
arguably present a different problem. The IRS simply cannot subject
all IRB guidance to APA notice-and-comment rulemaking, nor should
taxpayers want it to do so. As already noted, many IRB guidance
documents address minor housekeeping-type matters. Subjecting all
such pronouncements to notice-and-comment rulemaking would be
ridiculously wasteful. To a great extent, such fears are overblown, as
IRB guidance that is truly mundane or taxpayer friendly is unlikely to
face legal challenge. Nevertheless, the IRS could curtail the IRB
guidance it offers, even while taxpayers crave direction. Yet, the
courts should be equally wary of utilizing the fuzziness of the force of
law concept to categorically permit Treasury and the IRS to continue
their existing practices. Tax practitioners are already dismayed by the
power they perceive the Mayo decision has given to Treasury to
dictate legal outcomes. If courts allow Treasury to continue issuing
temporary regulations with only postpromulgation notice and
comment and also extend Chevron deference to those regulations,
their dismay will undoubtedly increase, and their respect for the tax
system will likely erode. Absent notice and comment, Chevron
339. See Asimow, supra note 148, at 712–15 (counting interim-final rules published in the
Federal Register and the agencies publishing them over time).
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deference for IRB guidance would present substantial legitimacy
issues.
The solution is neither purely administrative nor purely
judicial. Treasury, the IRS, and the courts all have the means to
facilitate more precise convergence between tax administration and
general administrative law requirements without dramatically
altering the status quo.
A. Administrative Solutions
Treasury and the IRS are the authors of the regulations and
practices that give rise to all of the force of law questions surrounding
temporary Treasury regulations and IRB guidance. To a great extent,
therefore, Treasury and the IRS possess the power to resolve the
problem as well.
Presumably Treasury would like to retain the legally binding
force of the temporary regulations it issues. At least prospectively,
Treasury could bring its use of temporary Treasury regulations into
line with general administrative law understandings of APA § 553
with little impact on contemporary tax practice. The two standard
justifications for issuing legally binding temporary Treasury
regulations rather than nonbinding proposed regulations are to
protect the integrity of the fisc and to provide taxpayers with guidance
upon which they can rely. Where circumstances truly warrant quick
action to protect the fisc, as may well be the case with respect to tax
shelters, for example, Treasury can still rely on the good cause
exception to justify temporary regulations. The Attorney General’s
Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act, generally considered the
authoritative history of that statute, is arguably consistent with this
assessment of the good cause exception, in that it offers as an example
of good cause “such circumstances that advance notice of [the
proposed] rules would tend to defeat their purpose.”340 In the future,
Treasury will simply need to provide the requisite specific and
particularized explanation that the courts require to substantiate a
valid good cause claim. If Treasury complies with the APA in this way,
then based on the above analysis, its penalty provisions will justifiably
apply, and Chevron review is entirely appropriate.

340. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 31. The specific example offered by the
manual is the issuance of financial controls, but the same concern would be true of most tax
shelters.
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Treasury’s usual unspecified and generic need for immediate
guidance is substantially less persuasive as a basis for utilizing
temporary Treasury regulations. By the time that it issues proposed
regulations, Treasury has already accomplished much of the work of
promulgating final regulations. Finalizing proposed regulations is
often accomplished in a matter of months, not years, especially when
the regulations in question are narrow in scope.341 But as I
documented empirically a few years ago, when the regulatory project
in question is broader, more complicated, or both, Treasury’s
temporary regulations may fail to consider key issues, forcing
Treasury to issue successive additional temporary regulations to
address those failings even while it continues to consider taxpayer
comments.342 In other words, Treasury’s haste to provide immediate
guidance sometimes merely increases rather than lessens taxpayer
confusion and uncertainty. Some tax attorneys charged with writing
legal opinions regarding the tax consequences of proposed
transactions (and their clients) undoubtedly prefer the comparative
binding effect of temporary Treasury regulations on the government
as well as taxpayers. For most other taxpayers, however, the desire for
guidance is driven by the goal of avoiding an audit, a deficiency notice,
and litigation. Toward those ends, most taxpayers do want to know
how the IRS interprets the law and happily follow whatever scrap of
guidance they can find without regard for its legal force. By contrast,
penalties for noncompliance while Treasury contemplates adjustments
in response to comments would not be these taxpayers’ preference. If
Treasury cannot articulate good cause with specificity and
particularity but nevertheless genuinely believes that taxpayers want
immediate guidance that they can rely upon, then Treasury ought
simply to inform taxpayers that, if they comply with proposed
regulations, they will not be targets for enforcement.
As for IRB guidance, the IRS’s preference presumably would be
avoiding the necessity of notice-and-comment rulemaking over binding
taxpayers through penalties. The meaning of “rules and regulations”
341. See, e.g., Amendment of Prohibited Payment Option Under Single-Employer Defined
Benefit Plan of Plan Sponsor in Bankruptcy, T.D. 9601, 77 Fed. Reg. 66,915-01, 66,916 (Nov. 8,
2012) (finalizing regulations initially proposed less than five months earlier, on June 21, 2012);
Guidance Under Section 267(f); Deferral of Loss on Transactions Between Members of a
Controlled Group, T.D. 9583, 77 Fed. Reg. 22,480-02, 22,481 (Apr. 16, 2012) (finalizing
regulations initially proposed approximately twelve months earlier, on April 21, 2011); Tax
Return Preparer Penalties Under Section 6695, T.D. 9570, 76 Fed. Reg. 78,816-01, 78,816–18
(Dec. 20, 2011) (finalizing proposed regulations issued only two months earlier, on October 21,
2011, notwithstanding comments received and changes made in response to those comments).
342. See Hickman, supra note 15, at 1801–04 (offering examples).
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is sufficiently ambiguous that, just as Treasury had the power to
extend that phrase to encompass revenue rulings, notices, and some
revenue procedures, Treasury likewise has the power to interpret that
phrase by rescinding that interpretation. Amending Treas. Reg. §
1.6662-3 to disassociate IRB guidance from statutory penalties offers
the most comprehensive solution, encompassing existing as well as
future IRB guidance documents. In the alternative, if Treasury and
the IRS want to continue to use IRB guidance formats to bind
taxpayers, or if Treasury simply wants to avoid the hassle of
amending its regulations, the IRS could at least mitigate its exposure
to judicial imposition of notice and comment requirements by shifting
housekeeping matters and other obviously nonlegislative guidance to
an alternative informal format that does not fall within the
definitional scope of Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3.
B. Judicial Solutions
Absent further judicial action, however, Treasury and the IRS
seem unlikely to alter their current practices. Meanwhile, courts are
faced with cases in which the government seeks to enforce the
requirements of temporary Treasury regulations and IRB guidance,
claiming Chevron deference for the former, and seeking to impose
penalties upon taxpayers for disregarding its pronouncements in both.
Courts have an obligation to require Treasury and the IRS to comply
with the APA and to effectuate taxpayers’ rights under that statute to
have their say in the legal rules that govern them. Yet, as already
suggested, courts should be wary of causing more harm than good
with a hard line, categorical response. If courts accept as their goal
prodding Treasury and the IRS toward greater compliance with the
APA without wholly undermining taxpayer expectations and reliance
upon existing Treasury regulations and IRB guidance, existing case
law offers a few possibilities for charting that middle path.
1. Open Minds and Harmless Errors
Scholarly and judicial consensus holds that the procedural
sequence Treasury uses when it adopts temporary regulations (and
the final regulations that succeed them) is inconsistent with APA
requirements absent a valid statutory exception from notice-andcomment rulemaking. Nevertheless, while the courts should not read
I.R.C. § 7805(e) as authorizing Treasury to issue temporary Treasury
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regulations at will,343 the fact remains that, due largely to I.R.C. §
7805(e), many Treasury regulations initially promulgated in
temporary form have since gone through public notice and comment.
Outside the tax context, some courts have concluded that such
postpromulgation notice and comment alone is inadequate to remedy
the initial procedural flaws of temporary or interim-final
regulations.344 As these courts have recognized, allowing
postpromulgation notice and comment to cure the procedural flaws of
temporary or interim-final regulations merely invites agencies to
ignore the APA’s procedural sequence whenever they like.345 Further,
as observed by the D.C. Circuit, “an agency is not likely to be receptive
to suggested changes once the agency puts its credibility on the line in
the form of final rules. People naturally tend to become more closeminded and defensive once they have made a final determination.”346
Courts in other cases, however, have expressed reluctance to
undo agency regulations where doing so would yield no substantive
difference.347 In some decisions, therefore, courts have declined to

343. See supra notes 169–178 and accompanying text (rebutting the Justice Department’s
claim that I.R.C. § 7805(e) independently authorizes the Treasury to issue temporary
regulations).
344. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 632 F.3d 912, 929 (5th Cir. 2011) (“Nor does
accepting post-promulgation comments excuse compliance with APA procedures. . . . If we
allowed post-promulgation comments to suffice in this case, ‘we would make the provisions of §
553 virtually unenforceable.’ ” (quoting U.S. Steel Corp. v. EPA, 595 F.2d 207, 214 (5th Cir.
1979))); Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. Dep’t of Transp., 900 F.2d 369, 379–80 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
vacated without opinion and remanded, 498 U.S. 1023 (1991), vacated as moot, 933 F.2d 1043
(D.C. Cir. 1991) (“Finally, we reject the FAA’s contention that its response to comments after
promulgation of the Penalty Rules cured any noncompliance with section 553.”); cf. U.S. Steel
Corp. v. EPA, 649 F.2d 572, 576 (8th Cir. 1981) (rejecting adequacy of postpromulgation notice
and comment to satisfy APA procedural requirements); Sharon Steel Corp. v. EPA, 597 F.2d 377,
381 (3d Cir. 1979) (“We hold that the period for comments after promulgation cannot substitute
for the prior notice and comment required by the APA.”).
345. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 683 F.2d 752, 768 (3d Cir. 1982) (“To
allow the APA procedures in connection with the further postponement to substitute for APA
procedures in connection with an initial postponement would allow EPA to substitute postpromulgation notice and comment procedures for pre-promulgation notice and comment
procedures at any time by taking an action without complying with the APA, and then
establishing a notice and comment procedure on the question of whether that action should be
continued.”); Sharon Steel Corp., 597 F.2d at 381 (“If a period for comments after issuance of a
rule could cure a violation of the APA’s requirements, an agency could negate at will the
Congressional decision that notice and an opportunity for comment must precede
promulgation.”).
346. Air Transp. Ass’n of Am., 900 F.2d at 379 (internal quotation marks and brackets
omitted).
347. See, e.g., U.S. Steel Corp. v. EPA, 605 F.2d 283, 291 (7th Cir. 1979) (“Given that the
agency was clearly willing to consider, fully and objectively, all comments in the post-
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invalidate final regulations solely due to their temporary or interimfinal origins, based upon findings that the agency’s handling of
postpromulgation comments demonstrated an “open mind” in the
process of adopting final regulations.348 In applying this standard, the
D.C. Circuit has suggested its presumption that the agency’s mind is
closed absent “a compelling showing” that the agency considered
comments received “with particularly searching consideration.”349
Courts have previously applied this open mind standard in
evaluating the procedural validity of regulations that strongly
resemble temporary Treasury regulations and their final successors.
For example, in Air Transport Ass’n of America v. Department of
Transportation, the FAA adopted an initial set of legally binding
regulations that it labeled as “final” without prepromulgation notice
and comment. Analogous to Treasury’s standard practice, in the same
document, the FAA requested comments, provided for a ninety-day
comment period, and subsequently responded in a document labeled
“Disposition of comments” without changing any regulatory
language.350 After deciding that the agency’s claim of good cause was
inadequate, the court held that “[t]he FAA has not come close to
overcoming the presumption of closed-mindedness in this case”
because the agency failed either to change its rules or otherwise
respond to public comments with “particularly searching
consideration.”351
In Intermountain Insurance Service of Vail, LLC v.
Commissioner, a D.C. Circuit panel suggested that the open mind
standard might not apply in evaluating temporary Treasury
regulations.352 According to the D.C. Circuit in that case:
Ordinarily, we evaluate an agency’s so-called open-mindedness only
when it issues final regulations without the requisite comment period
and then tries to cure that Administrative Procedure Act violation by
holding a post-promulgation comment period. Here the Commissioner
simultaneously issued immediately effective temporary regulations
promulgation period, there is no reason to believe that its consideration of the comments would
have been any different if completed before the effective date.”).
348. See, e.g., Advocates for Highway & Auto Safety v. Fed. Highway Admin., 28 F.3d 1288,
1292 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“What is at issue is whether the FHWA displayed an open mind when
considering the comments received in response to the June 3rd request.”); Levesque v. Block, 723
F.2d 175, 188 (1st Cir. 1983) (“When the response suggests that the agency has been openminded, the presumption against a late comment period can be overcome and a rule upheld.”).
349. Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety, 28 F.3d at 1292 (quoting Air Transport Ass’n of
Am., 900 F.2d at 379–80).
350. 900 F.2d at 373.
351. Id. at 380.
352. 650 F.3d 691, 709–10 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
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and a notice of proposed rulemaking for identical final regulations and
then held a 90-day comment period before finalizing the regulations. 353

From this limited passage, it is unclear whether the D.C. Circuit
intended to repudiate altogether the applicability of the open mind
standard for temporary Treasury regulations or, if so, exactly why.
Treasury clearly labels its temporary regulations as such, rather than
as final or interim-final. By comparison, the regulatory documents in
the case cited by the Intermountain Court as its contrary example,
Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety v. Federal Highway
Administration,354 were not precisely identified as final, either, but
rather carried the labels “Notice of intent to accept applications for
waivers,”355 “Receipt of waiver applications; request for comments,”356
and “Notice of final disposition.”357 At least one other circuit has
applied the open mind standard in evaluating regulations that started
as “interim-final” rules.358 It is unclear why the label a rule bears,
rather than the legal effect of the rule, should matter for purposes of
the open mind standard, and the Intermounatin court did not
elaborate further. Also, while the initial rule and request for
comments in Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety were published
several weeks apart rather than simultaneously, the Intermountain
court did not explain why that distinction should matter, either.
The open mind standard represents one potential middle path
for dealing with temporary Treasury regulations. Although
jurisprudence applying the open mind standard is limited, courts are
already at least somewhat familiar with it. APA § 706 instructs courts
reviewing agency action to take “due account . . . of the rule of
prejudicial error,”359 offering a textual anchor for an open mind
standard for evaluating Treasury regulations with temporary origins.
Most importantly, the open mind standard provides Treasury an
opportunity to demonstrate case by case that its inversion of the
APA’s procedural sequence was indeed harmless (or at least less
353. Id. at 709.
354. 28 F.3d 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
355. Qualification of Drivers; Waiver Applications; Vision, Notice of Intent to Accept
Applications for Waivers, 57 Fed. Reg. 10,295 (Mar. 25, 1992).
356. Qualification of Drivers; Waiver Applications; Vision, Receipt of Waiver Applications;
Request for Comments, 57 Fed. Reg. 23,370 (June 3, 1992).
357. Qualification of Drivers; Vision Waivers, Notice of Final Disposition, 57 Fed. Reg.
31,458 (July 16, 1992).
358. See Mortg. Investors Corp. of Ohio v. Gober, 220 F.3d 1375, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(evaluating the agency’s open-mindedness with respect to an interim-final rule followed by
postpromulgation notice and comment).
359. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006).
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harmful than invalidating the regulation), while giving courts the
flexibility to enforce the APA’s expectations where Treasury cannot
meet that burden.
As another possible application of the “prejudicial error”
language of APA § 706, at least one court has employed an alternative
“harmless error” rule to excuse deviations from APA rulemaking
requirements. The Fifth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Johnson
is particularly instructive, as the procedures considered by the court
in that case fairly closely approximate Treasury’s approach to
temporary regulations.360 In Johnson, the court considered the validity
of a regulation interpreting the Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act (“SORNA”), which regulation was promulgated by the
Attorney General initially as an interim-final rule accompanied by a
good cause claim and request for public comments.361 A few months
later, the Attorney General separately issued a NOPR, requested
comments, and subsequently issued final regulations.362 The Johnson
court rejected the Attorney General’s good cause argument, and also
rebuffed postpromulgation notice and comment as a categorical cure
for improperly promulgated temporary or interim-final rules.363 “If we
allowed post-promulgation comments to suffice in this case, ‘we would
make the provisions of § 553 virtually unenforceable.’ ”364
Nevertheless, citing among other cases the Supreme Court’s decision
in Shinseki v. Sanders, the Johnson court went on to conclude that the
Attorney General’s failure to comply with the APA in that instance
represented harmless error, “in part because the interim rule
publication addressed counter-arguments and set forth the basis and
purpose of the rule.”365
360. 632 F.3d 912 (5th Cir. 2011).
361. Office of the Attorney General; Applicability of the Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act, Interim Rule with Request for Comments, 72 Fed. Reg. 8894 (Feb. 28, 2007).
362. See Office of the Attorney General; The National Guidelines for Sex Offender
Registration and Notification, Final Guidelines 73 Fed. Reg. 38,030 (July 2, 2008) (finalizing
proposed SORNA regulations); Office of the Attorney General; The National Guidelines for Sex
Offender Registration and Notification, Notice; Proposed Guidelines, 72 Fed. Reg. 30,210 (May
30, 2007) (proposing comprehensive regulations implementing SORNA). For good measure, in
response to complaints that the Attorney General had not actually finalized the initial interimfinal rule, the Attorney General formally did so and addressed comments received in response
thereto, although without in any way altering the final regulations adopted in July 2008. See
Office of the Attorney General; Applicability of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification
Act, Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 81,849 (Dec. 29, 2010) (formally “finalizing” the 2007 interim
SORNA regulation, effective January 28, 2011).
363. Johnson, 632 F.3d at 929–31.
364. Id. at 929 (quoting U.S. Steel Corp. v. EPA, 595 F.2d. 207, 214 (5th Cir. 1979)).
365. Id. at 931.
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According to the Supreme Court in Sanders, evaluating the
applicability of the harmless error rule is a distinctly case-by-case
determination that considers, among other factors,
an estimation of the likelihood that the result would have been
different, an awareness of what body (jury, lower court, administrative
agency) has the authority to reach that result, a consideration of the
error’s likely effects on the perceived fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings, and a hesitancy to generalize too
broadly about particular kinds of errors when the specific factual
circumstances in which the error arises may well make all the
difference.”366

Although courts have placed the burden of demonstrating an open
mind on the agency, in describing the harmless error rule, the Sanders
Court placed the burden of showing prejudice on the party challenging
the regulation.367 Nevertheless, the Court went on to elaborate that
the burden of demonstrating that the agency’s error was harmful
should not be particularly onerous. “Often the circumstances of the
case will make clear to the appellate judge that the ruling, if
erroneous, was harmful and nothing further need be said. But, if not,
then the party seeking reversal normally must explain why the
erroneous ruling caused harm.”368
As was the case in Johnson, the typical temporary Treasury
regulation is accompanied by a preamble in which Treasury offers
some explanation of and justification for its interpretive choices. The
simultaneously issued NOPR cross-references that document.
Presumably many, if not most, of the preambles that accompany
temporary Treasury regulations provide adequate justification for
Treasury’s
interpretations
to
support
a
conclusion that
postpromulgation notice and comment represented harmless error.
Like the open mind standard, therefore, the harmless error rule
provides courts with a potential basis for upholding many if not most
Treasury regulations while still effectuating taxpayer rights under the
APA.

366. 556 U.S. 396, 411–12 (2009). Shinseki concerned the interpretation of prejudicial error
language in the statute governing the Veterans Court rather than the APA. Id. at 406. In
considering that language, however, the Court observed that “Congress used the same words in
the Administrative Procedure Act” and noted that “[l]egislative history confirms that Congress
intended the Veterans Court ‘prejudicial error’ statute to ‘incorporate a reference’ to the APA’s
approach.” Id. at 406–07. Consequently, the Court proceeded to evaluate the case at bar “in light
of our general case law governing application of the harmless-error standard.” Id. at 407.
367. Id. at 409.
368. Id. at 410.
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2. Chevron Step Two
While the open mind standard and the harmless error rule
offer interesting potential alternatives for addressing APA procedural
challenges against temporary Treasury regulations and final Treasury
regulations with temporary origins, in many cases, taxpayers do not
explicitly raise a direct APA challenge in the course of tax litigation,
or at least they do so in a manner clearly distinct from their claims
regarding substantive validity. To paraphrase and perhaps
oversimplify some litigation briefs, taxpayers often argue merely that
courts should decline to extend Chevron deference to temporary
Treasury regulations because Treasury has not employed notice and
comment procedures in issuing those rules. Correspondingly, in cases
concerning IRB guidance, taxpayers may argue simply that Skidmore
provides the appropriate evaluative standard, again solely because the
IRS did not subject its interpretations to notice and comment.
One way of construing such arguments—and the way I think
courts have often read them in the past—is as invoking Mead’s twopart test. If courts accept the analysis of this Article regarding the
proper application of Mead to temporary Treasury regulations and
IRB guidance, then the above-described arguments must fail, as the
lack of notice and comment alone does not dictate the standard of
review. Chevron deference may apply, but potentially for the wrong
reason, creating doctrinal confusion.
By contrast, another construction of these arguments exists
that would allow the courts to clarify the relationship between
procedural compliance and Chevron deference. In Burks v. United
States, the Fifth Circuit in dicta suggested that noncompliance with
the procedural requirements of notice-and-comment rulemaking
where they clearly apply represents an alternative reason for
declining to defer to an agency’s legal interpretation as arbitrary and
capricious at Chevron step two.369 Although the Burks court did not
offer much analysis for this assertion, existing law does offer some
basis for such an argument.
In Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n of United States, Inc. v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. and subsequent cases,
the Supreme Court interpreted the arbitrary and capricious standard
of APA § 706(2)(A) as requiring agencies to contemporaneously justify

369. See Burks v. United States, 633 F.3d 347, 360 n.9 (5th Cir. 2011).
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their interpretive choices.370 Encouraged by at least some
administrative law scholars,371 many courts have extended the second
step of Chevron analysis to encompass not only an evaluation of the
substantive validity of agency action but also the variant of arbitrary
and capricious review envisioned by the Court in State Farm.372 In
other words, by incorporating the State Farm approach to the
arbitrary and capricious standard of APA § 706(2)(A) into Chevron
step two analysis, these courts have rejected agency interpretations of
ambiguous statutes that might otherwise be substantively valid on the
ground that the agency has failed to explain the basis for its choice.
Although the Supreme Court has not conclusively embraced this
melding of State Farm arbitrary and capricious review and Chevron
step two, it has at least hinted that its sympathies may lie in that
direction.373
At least in theory, an APA procedural challenge is reviewable
under APA § 706(2)(D), which specifically instructs reviewing courts
to invalidate regulations that fail to comply with statutory procedures,
rather than under the arbitrary and capricious standard of APA §
370. 463 U.S. 29, 42–43 (1983) (rejecting rules where the agency has, inter alia, “relied on
factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important
aspect of the problem, [or] offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the
evidence before the agency”); see also, e.g., Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 483–84 (2011)
(applying State Farm arbitrary and capricious—or hard look—review to reject agency action);
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 514–16 (2009) (elaborating the parameters of
arbitrary and capricious review under APA § 706(2)(A) and State Farm).
371. See, e.g., Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.KENT L. REV. 1253, 1285–86 (1997) (advocating a merger of Chevron step two and State Farm
hard look review based on an analysis of D.C. Circuit jurisprudence); Mark Seidenfeld, A
Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency
Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83, 128–29 (1994) (“Substituting something akin to
hard look review for the deferential reasonableness standard that courts have used in Chevron’s
step two would go far toward implementing the deliberative model.”).
372. See Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 41 F.3d
721, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (noting that “the inquiry at the second step of Chevron overlaps
analytically with a court’s task under the [APA] . . . in determining whether agency action is
arbitrary and capricious (unreasonable)”); see also Leyse v. Clear Channel Broad. Inc., 697 F.3d
360, 372 (6th Cir. 2012) (describing Chevron step two analysis by reference to State Farm); River
Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 111, 115 (1st Cir. 2009) (explaining the Chevron
framework in State Farm terms); North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 906 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(quoting State Farm standard in describing Chevron analysis). But see Recording Indus. Ass’n of
Amer., Inc. v. Librarian of Cong., 608 F.3d 861, 865 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“[T]his is a State Farm case,
not a Chevron case.”); Rural Cellular Ass’n v. FCC, 588 F.3d 1095, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“Unlike
Chevron step two review, which focuses on whether the agency’s interpretation was reasonable,
‘arbitrary and capricious’ review focuses on the reasonableness of the agency’s decisionmaking
processes.”).
373. See Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 483 n.7 (2011) (calling Chevron step two and arbitrary and
capricious review under APA § 706(2)(A) “the same” in dicta).

2b. Hickman_PAGE (Do Not Delete)

542

3/25/2013 3:45 PM

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:2:465

706(2)(A). Nevertheless, APA § 706(2)(A) in full correspondingly
compels reviewing courts to set aside regulations found to be
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law.”374 Failing to comply with congressionally
mandated procedural requirements, whether found in APA § 553(b) or
elsewhere, is obviously not in accordance with law. Viewing APA §
706(2)(A) and (D) in this way supports the Burks court’s linkage of
procedural noncompliance with Chevron step two.
In any case in which the government bases its enforcement
claims upon a temporary Treasury regulation or IRB guidance
document, and particularly where the government asserts penalties
for noncompliance with those formats, courts should recognize that
Chevron provides the appropriate evaluative standard. When
confronted with taxpayer arguments that Chevron deference is
inappropriate or Skidmore review applies due to the government’s
lack of notice and comment, courts ought to adopt the approach
suggested by the Burks court. In other words, courts should, at
Chevron step two, at least contemplate whether the want of notice and
comment procedures means that Treasury regulations and IRB
guidance documents are arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law.
Such an approach does not necessarily mean that the taxpayer
will win in all cases. For example, courts may conclude that the
government’s interpretation of the law is demonstrably correct at
Chevron step one. Alternatively, in the case of temporary Treasury
regulations with postpromulgation notice and comment, courts could
decide at Chevron step two that the lack of notice and comment
represents harmless error, as described above. But to the extent that
the I.R.C. is ambiguous, blending Chevron step two and procedural
review in this manner again offers courts flexibility to accept or reject
temporary Treasury regulations or IRB guidance documents case by
case while maintaining doctrinal consistency.
CONCLUSION
From an administrative law perspective, the tax system is a bit
of a mess. Unnoticed and unchecked, administrative law doctrine and
the government’s tax administrative practices evolved in different
directions. Many legal scholars would argue that existing
administrative law doctrines are misguided and that the government’s
tax administrative practices are better. They may be right as a
374. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006) (emphasis added).
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normative matter. For one thing, as this Article amply demonstrates,
applying the framework of Mead, Chevron, and Skidmore
formalistically may lead to some challenging conclusions. Now that
the Supreme Court in Mayo has asserted its policy of administrative
law uniformity vis-à-vis the tax system, however, reconciling the tax
administrative practices and administrative law doctrines becomes
necessary. The courts are more likely to require tax administration to
fall in line with general administrative law norms than the other way
around.
Hence, the purpose of this Article is not to justify the
administrative law doctrines discussed herein, but rather to explore
the implications and possibilities of those doctrines for the temporary
regulations and IRB guidance formats that are such an integral part
of the existing tax laws. Some uncertainty is perhaps inevitable as the
tax community resolves the discrepancies between administrative law
doctrines and actual practices. The solution, however, is not to bury
our heads in the sand and hope the problems that Mayo brings to the
fore go away. It is much better to face those issues head on, with
concrete proposals for resolving them coherently.

